Supplementary Material for
"Contextual Bandits with Knapsacks for a Conversion Model"

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This supplementary material contains the following elements.

- Appendix A provides the industrial motivation behind the setting described in Section 2.1, namely, within the banking industry, a market share expansion for loans.

- Appendix B contains the proof of Theorem 1, i.e., the regret bound in case of a known distribution ν, except for a lemma on learning the parameter of logistic bandits, provided in Appendix C.

- Appendix C states and proves the indicated lemma; both the statement and the proof are mere adaptations of Faury et al. [2020, Lemmas 1 and 2].

- Appendix D contains the proof of Theorem 2, i.e., explains how to adapt the proof of Appendix B to the case of an unknown distribution ν.

- Appendix E details the claims of Section 6, i.e., the extension of the techniques introduced to the setting of linear CBwK.

- Appendix F reports a simulation study based on realistic data.

We also discuss below the potential negative societal impacts of our article.

Potential Negative Societal Impacts

This article is mainly theoretical and provides a stochastic-bandit framework and tools that can be applied in questionable ways or, on the contrary, for the benefits of important societal issues (typically, clinical trials)—put differently, we provide a general-purpose methodology, for which ethical impacts are always difficult to assess. That being said, here, the main risk in our eyes would be that if a company sells products that have a potential negative social impact, it may use the policies proposed by this paper to boost the sales by being able to offer personalized discounts.

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A Industrial Motivation: Market Share Expansion for Loans

We describe the industrial problem we faced and which led to the setting described in Section 2.1.

Incentives and discounts are common practices in many industries to achieve some business objectives; however, there is usually a limit on the number or/and total volume of discounts that can be granted, so companies need to select carefully who should receive them. We consider, for instance, the banking industry, with a business objective of market share expansion: achieving the highest possible volume of loan subscription (total subscribed amount). Note that in practice, all loan applications need to go first through a risk-assessment process, and offers are only made if the bank considers that the loan will not put the customer's solvability at risk. We assume that all the clients concerned here have already gone through this process and are eligible for getting a loan from a given bank. We formulate the problem in a sequential manner as follows.

At each round $t \geqslant 1$, a client asks for a credit product. Her/his characteristics are denoted by $\boldsymbol{x}_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$, and encompass the socio-demographic profile, the loan request (amount $x_{\mathrm{am},t}$, duration $x_{\mathrm{dur},t}$), etc. It is reasonable to model these characteristics as independent draws from a common (possibly unknown) distribution ν. Based on $\boldsymbol{x}_t$, the bank will suggest some standard interest rate $\mathrm{ir}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)$ based on its pricing rules; the detail of the rules is not relevant and we assume that the underlying function ir is given. If client t accepts the offered rate $\mathrm{ir}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)$ and subscribes to the loan, an event which we denote by $y_t = 1$ and call a conversion, the bank gets a sales performance (gain on volume) $x_{\mathrm{am},t}$. Otherwise, the client declines the offer, which we denote by $y_t = 0$ and the bank gets a null reward.

Actually, to improve the chances of a conversion, the bank may also offer a discount $a_t \in (0,1]$, or lack of discount $a_t = 0$, on the interest rate. If it offers a discount $a_t > 0$ and $y_t = 1$, the bank will suffer a loss of earnings, equal to $a_t \, \mathrm{ir}(\boldsymbol{x}_t) \, \mathrm{out}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)$, where $\mathrm{out}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)$ denotes the total outstanding amounts. This loss of earnings is considered a promotion cost. These promotion costs are summed up to previous such costs and should usually not exceed a fixed-in-advance budget $B_2 > 0$. Also, there is usually a fixed-in-advance limit $B_1 > 0$ on the total number of clients who can subscribe with a discount.

Given that the customers' characteristics are i.i.d., it is indeed reasonable to assume that y_t follows some Bernoulli distribution with unknown probability $P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$. Of course, the higher the discount, the higher the probability of a conversion.

We summarize the setting with the notation of Section 2.1. We assume that discounts are picked in a finite grid $\mathcal{D} = \big\{ j/D : j \in \{0, \ldots, D\} \big\}$, so that the action set equals $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{D} \cup \{a_{\mathrm{null}}\}$. At each round $t \geqslant 1$, given the customer's characteristics $\boldsymbol{x}_t$ and the discount $a_t \in [0,1]$ picked by the bank, the latter receives the following reward and suffers the following costs:

$$r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t, \qquad \text{where} \qquad r : (a, \boldsymbol{x}) \mapsto x_{\mathrm{am}},$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t, \qquad \text{where} \qquad \boldsymbol{c} : (a, \boldsymbol{x}) \mapsto \big(\mathbb{1}_{\{a \neq 0\}}, \, a\, \mathrm{ir}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)\, \mathrm{out}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)\big).$$

The first component of the cumulative cost vector measures the total number subscriptions with discounts, and the second component reports the total promotion costs. The bank wants to enforce

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \big(\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq 0\}}, \, a_t\, \mathrm{ir}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)\, \mathrm{out}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)\big)\, y_t \leqslant (B_1, \, B_2)$$

while maximizing the sum of the achieved rewards.

Normalizations in $[0,1]$ both for rewards and cost components may be achieved by considering the maximal amount M_{am} and outstanding M_{out} that the bank would allow, and by considering

$$r : (a, \boldsymbol{x}) \mapsto x_{\mathrm{am}}/M_{\mathrm{am}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \boldsymbol{c} : (a, \boldsymbol{x}) \mapsto \big(\mathbb{1}_{\{a \neq 0\}}, \, a\, \mathrm{ir}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)\, \mathrm{out}(\boldsymbol{x}_t)/M_{\mathrm{out}}\big)$$

with the alternative budget $(B_1, \, B_2/M_{\mathrm{out}})$. A single budget parameter $B = \min\big\{B_1, \, B_2/M_{\mathrm{out}}\big\}$ may be considered by a final normalization: by dividing the first cost component by $B_1/B > 1$ if $B_1 > B$, or the second cost component by $(B_2/M_{\mathrm{out}})/B > 1$ if $B_2/M_{\mathrm{out}} > B$, respectively.

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B Detailed Proof of the Regret Bound in Case of a Known Distribution ν: Proof of Theorem 1

The proof is divided into four steps.

B.1 First Step: Defining Confidence Intervals on the Probabilities $P(a, \boldsymbol{x})$

The keystone of this step is the following lemma, adapted from Faury et al. [2020]: it provides guarantees for the adapted version of Logistic-UCB1 defined in Phase 1 of the adaptive policy studied in this article. The lemma actually holds for any sampling strategy of the arms, not just the one used in Phase 2 of the adaptive policy.

The reasons of the adaptations, lying in different settings being considered, as well as a detailed proof, are provided in Appendix C. We recall that we denote

$$\kappa = \sup\left\{\frac{1}{\dot{\eta}(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta})} : \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \ a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\mathrm{null}}\}, \ \boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta\right\},$$

and that since $\dot{\eta} = \eta(1 - \eta) \in [0, 1/4]$, we always have $\kappa \geqslant 4$. We also recall the notation for the maximal Euclidean norm of an element in Θ:

$$\|\Theta\| = \max_{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta} \|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|.$$

Lemma 1 (combination of Lemmas 1 and 2 of Faury et al. [2020] with minor adjustments, detailed in Appendix C). *Assume that $\kappa < +\infty$. Fix any sampling strategy and consider the version of Logistic-UCB1 given by (3)–(5). For all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, there exists an event $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$ with probability at least $1 - \delta$ and such that over $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$:*

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \ \forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{null}\}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \left|\widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - P(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right| \leqslant$$

$$\gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta}\sqrt{\kappa(\|\Theta\| + 1/2)} \, \|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\|_{V_t^{-1}},$$

where

$$\gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} = \sqrt{\lambda}(\|\Theta\| + 1/2) + \frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}}\ln\left(\frac{2^m}{\delta}\left(1 + \frac{t}{4m\lambda}\right)^{m/2}\right)$$

and

$$V_t = \sum_{s=1}^{t} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}}\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{null}\}} + \kappa\lambda\,\mathrm{I}_m.$$

Associated confidence intervals for the $P(a, \boldsymbol{x})$. Thanks to this lemma, we consider the upper-confidence bonuses

$$\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta}\sqrt{\kappa(\|\Theta\| + 1/2)} \, \|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\|_{V_t^{-1}}. \tag{9}$$

On the event $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$ of Lemma 1, we have, for all $t \geqslant 1$, all $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\mathrm{null}}\}$, and all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$: on the one hand,

$$U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \min\left\{\widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + \varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}), 1\right\} \geqslant \min\{P(a, \boldsymbol{x}), 1\} = P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \tag{10}$$

and on the other hand,

$$U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \min\left\{\widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + \varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}), 1\right\} \leqslant \widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + \varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + 2\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}). \tag{11}$$

Control of the sum of upper-confidence bonuses. According to the proof sketch of Section 4, it only remains to control the sum of the upper-confidence bonuses at observed contexts $\boldsymbol{x}_t$ and played actions a_t. Note that at rounds $t \geqslant 2$, we use the bonuses $\varepsilon_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$. We prove that

$$2\sum_{t=2}^{T}\varepsilon_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} \leqslant \underbrace{\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta}\sqrt{\kappa(4\|\Theta\| + 2)}\sqrt{2mT\max\left\{1, \frac{1}{\kappa\lambda}\right\}\ln\left(1 + \frac{T}{\kappa\lambda m}\right)}}_{\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} E_T}. \tag{12}$$

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To that end, we first note that $\gamma_{t-1,\lambda,\delta} \leqslant \gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta}$:

$$2 \sum_{t=2}^{T} \varepsilon_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} \leqslant \gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta} \sqrt{\kappa(4\|\Theta\|+2)} \sum_{t=2}^{T} \| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \|_{V_{t-1}^{-1}} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} .$$

Given that $\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}\| \leqslant 1$ by assumption, a direct application of Lemma 2 below (a classical result of basic algebra for linear bandits) ensures that

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \|_{V_{t-1}^{-1}}^{2} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} \leqslant 2m \max \left\{ 1, \ \frac{1}{\kappa\lambda} \right\} \ln \left(1 + \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}}}{\kappa\lambda m} \right).$$

A Cauchy-Schwarz inequality thus entails

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \|_{V_{t-1}^{-1}} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} \leqslant \sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}}} \sqrt{2m \max \left\{ 1, \ \frac{1}{\kappa\lambda} \right\} \ln \left(1 + \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}}}{\kappa\lambda m} \right)}$$

$$\leqslant \sqrt{T} \sqrt{2m \max \left\{ 1, \ \frac{1}{\kappa\lambda} \right\} \ln \left(1 + \frac{T}{\kappa\lambda m} \right)},$$

which concludes this step.

Lemma 2 (Elliptic potential and determinant-trace inequality, cf. Lemmas 10 and 11 of Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [2011], Lemmas 15 and 16 of Faury et al. [2020]). *For all $\lambda > 0$ and all sequences $\boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2, \ldots$ of vectors in $\mathbb{R}^m$ with $\|\boldsymbol{u}_s\| \leqslant 1$, defining $U_0 = \lambda \operatorname{I}_m$ and for $t \geqslant 1$,*

$$U_t = \lambda \operatorname{I}_m + \sum_{s=1}^{t} \boldsymbol{u}_t (\boldsymbol{u}_t)^{\mathrm{T}} ,$$

we have, for all $\tau \geqslant 1$:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\tau} \|\boldsymbol{u}_t\|_{U_{t-1}^{-1}}^{2} \leqslant 2m \max \left\{ 1, \ \frac{1}{\lambda} \right\} \ln \left(1 + \frac{\tau}{\lambda m} \right).$$

B.2 Second Step: Dual Formulation of the Sampling Phase (Phase 2) and Consequences

In this step, we consider a round $t \geqslant 2$ for which the cost constraints of Phase 0 of the adaptive policy are not violated and the optimization problem $\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_{t,T})$ is to be solved; its solution is the policy $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ used to sample a_t according to $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$.

We first rewrite in its dual form the optimization problem $\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_{t,T})$ and show that strong duality holds. As a consequence, there exists a vector $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ such that $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ may be identified as

$$\underset{\pi : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})}{\operatorname{argmax}} \ \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[T \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) + \sum_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \beta_{\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star} \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \right].$$

By exploiting the KKT conditions, we are able to get rid of the double sum above and finally get a $\mathcal{X}$–pointwise characterization of $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$: for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \underset{\boldsymbol{q} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})}{\operatorname{argmax}} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) q_a ,$$

where, with no impact, we may replace the $r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ by their non-negative parts. The distributions $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})$ may therefore be interpreted as maximizing some upper-confidence bound on penalized gains (rewards minus some scalarized costs).

We also prove $\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) \geqslant B_T (\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star})^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1}$ based on the KKT conditions.

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Primal form of the optimization problem $\textsc{opt}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)$. Since $\mathcal{X}$ is a finite set (this is actually the key place where we need this assumption), the optimization problem $\textsc{opt}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)$ may be stated as the *opposite* of

$$\min_{(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}} - T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$\text{under} \quad T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] \leqslant B_T \boldsymbol{1} \,,$$

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \geqslant 0 \,,$$

$$\forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) = 1 \,.$$

Thanks to the no-op action $a_{\text{null}} \in \mathcal{A}$, which is used to model abstention and results in null rewards and costs, i.e., $r(a_{\text{null}}, \boldsymbol{x}) = 0$ and $\boldsymbol{c}(a_{\text{null}}, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{0}$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$, we may relax the third constraint into

$$\forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant 1 \,.$$

Indeed, any vector $(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}$ satisfying the constraint with $\leqslant 1$ can be transformed into a vector $(\pi'_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}$ for which the expected reward and the first and second constraints remain identical while the third constraint is satisfied with $= 1$: by adding the necessary probability mass to the components $\pi_{a_{\text{null}}}(\boldsymbol{x})$.

In the sequel, we consider this primal problem with the $\leqslant 1$ constraint:

$$-\textsc{opt}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) = \min_{(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}} - T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$\text{under} \quad T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] \leqslant B_T \boldsymbol{1} \,, \quad (13)$$

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \geqslant 0 \,,$$

$$\forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant 1 \,.$$

It forms a convex optimization problem, as its objective and its constraints are all affine (Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004, Section 4.2.1]).

Lagrangian (dual) form of the optimization problem. Denote by $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}$, $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}}$, $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}$ the vector dual variables associated with the constraints on budget [budg], non-negative probability [p-pos], and sum of probabilities [p-sum], respectively. The vectors $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}}$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}$ have components $\beta_{\boldsymbol{x}}^{\text{p-sum}}$ and $\beta_{\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos}}$ indexed by $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

We define the Lagrangian associated with our primal problem:

$$\mathcal{L}_t \left(\left(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{a,\boldsymbol{x}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}} \right)$$

$$= - T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$+ \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}} \right)^{\mathsf{T}} \left(T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] - B_T \boldsymbol{1} \right) \quad (14)$$

$$+ \sum_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \beta_{\boldsymbol{x}}^{\text{p-sum}} \left(\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) - 1 \right) - \sum_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \beta_{\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos}} \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \,.$$

The dual problem consists of maximizing

$$\inf_{(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}} \mathcal{L}_t \left(\left(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{a,\boldsymbol{x}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}} \right)$$

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under the constraints that all components of the $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}}$ are non-negative, which we denote in a vector-wise manner by

$$\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \qquad \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \qquad \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}.$$

Strong duality and consequences. We explain why the so-called Slater's condition (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, Section 5.2.3) holds; it entails that the value $-\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)$ of the primal problem equals the value of the Lagrangian dual problem. The primal problem is convex, all its constraints are affine, with domain $\mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}$: Slater's condition therefore reduces to feasibility. And feasibility of the constraints is clear by taking Dirac masses on a_{null}, i.e., $\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) = \delta_{a_{\text{null}}}$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$. Since the values of the primal and dual problems are clearly larger than $-T > -\infty$, Slater's condition also implies that the dual optimal value is achieved at a dual feasible set of parameters, i.e., that the the constrained supremum and the infimum defining the dual problem are a minimum and a maximum, respectively. We may therefore summarize the consequences of Slater's condition as follows:

$$-\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) = \max_{\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}}} \min_{(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}} \mathcal{L}_t\Big(\big(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})\big)_{a,\boldsymbol{x}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}}\Big)$$
$$\text{under} \qquad \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \qquad \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \qquad \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}.$$

Because of strong duality and the existence of a dual feasible set of parameters, the max-min above equals its min-max counterpart (Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004, Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2]):

$$-\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) = \min_{(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}} \max_{\boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}} \geqslant \mathbf{0}} \mathcal{L}_t\Big(\big(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})\big)_{a,\boldsymbol{x}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{budg}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-sum}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\text{p-pos}}\Big).$$

We let $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$, $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-sum},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$, and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-pos},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$ be an optimal dual solution and recall that $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ denote an optimal primal solution, which, with no loss of generality, may be assumed satisfying the $\leqslant 1$ constraints with equality. From Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004, Section 5.4.2], this pair of solutions forms a saddle-point for the Lagrangian; in particular,

$$-\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) = \mathcal{L}_t\big(\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot), \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-sum},\star}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-pos},\star}\big) \qquad (15)$$
$$= \min_{(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X}}} \mathcal{L}_t\Big(\big(\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})\big), \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-sum},\star}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-pos},\star}\Big)$$
$$= \min_{\pi: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \mathcal{L}_t\big(\pi, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-sum},\star}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-pos},\star}\big).$$

The distribution $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ played thus appears as the argument of the minimum above.

Substituting the definition (14) of $\mathcal{L}_t$ into the characterization (15), rearranging the first two terms of $\mathcal{L}_t$, noting that the third term of $\mathcal{L}_t$ is null, and discarding the constant term $B_T\big(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \mathbf{1}$, we get:

$$\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot) \in \qquad (16)$$
$$\underset{\pi: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})}{\text{argmin}} \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[-T \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) + \big(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\Big) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) - \sum_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \beta_{\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star} \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \right]$$
$$= \underset{\pi: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})}{\text{argmax}} \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[T \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) - \big(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\Big) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) + \sum_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \beta_{\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star} \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \right].$$

We further simplify this alternative definition by showing that the sums of the $\beta_{\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos}} \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})$ may be omitted. We do so by exploiting the KKT conditions.

KKT conditions: statement. The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions (Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004, Section 5.5.3]) for the primal optimal $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot) : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$ and the dual optimal $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$, $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-sum},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$, and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-pos},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$ imply the following conditions: first, complementary slackness, which reads

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \beta_{t,\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star} \, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) = 0 \qquad (17)$$

and

$$\big(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] = \frac{B_T}{T} \big(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \mathbf{1}; \qquad (18)$$

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second, a stationary condition, based on the fact that the gradient of the Lagrangian function (14) with respect to the $\pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})$ vanishes. Denoting by $\nu(\boldsymbol{x})$ the probability mass put by ν on $\boldsymbol{x}$, we have:

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad T\, r(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, \nu(\boldsymbol{x})$$
$$= \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \left(T\, \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, \nu(\boldsymbol{x})\right) + \beta_{t,\boldsymbol{x}}^{\text{p-sum},\star} - \beta_{t,\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star}. \quad (19)$$

KKT conditions: first consequence—final characterization of $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$. For now, we only exploit (17): this equality and the fact that $\beta_{t,\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star}\, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{x})$ is always non-negative show that, as announced, the characterization (16) may be further simplified into

$$\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot) \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{\pi:\mathcal{X}\to\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \ \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\nu}\left[T \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X})\right]$$
$$= \operatorname*{argmax}_{\pi:\mathcal{X}\to\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \ \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\nu}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X})\right]. \quad (20)$$

In the characterization (20), as we got rid of the cross terms, the maximization may be carried out in a $\mathcal{X}$–pointwise manner, i.e., by separately computing each probability distribution $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$. More formally, for each $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, q_a. \quad (21)$$

In this characterization, $r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ appears as a penalized gain in case a client with characteristics $\boldsymbol{x}$ converts, and $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})$ is obtained by combining an upper-confidence-bound estimation $U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ of the conversion rate $P(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ with this penalized gain.

Denote by $(z)_+ = \max\{z, 0\}$ the non-negative part of $z \in \mathbb{R}$ and fix $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$. Given that the no-op action a_{null} is such that $r(a_{\text{null}}, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a_{\text{null}}, \boldsymbol{x}) = 0$ and $U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \geqslant 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, in view of the objective, any distribution $\boldsymbol{q}$ should move the probability mass q_a on an action $a \in \mathcal{A}$ with $r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - (\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) < 0$ to a_{null}. As a consequence,

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, q_a(\boldsymbol{x})$$
$$= \max_{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right)_+ U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, q_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \quad (22)$$

and

$$\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right)_+ U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, q_a. \quad (23)$$

KKT conditions: a second consequence. We first exploit the stationary condition (19). Multiplying both sides of this equality by $p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})$, summing over $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ and $a \in A$, we obtain an equality between expectations with respect to $\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu$:

$$T\, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\nu}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right]$$
$$= \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \left(T\, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\nu}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right]\right) \quad (24)$$
$$+ \sum_{\boldsymbol{x}\in\mathcal{X}} \beta_{t,\boldsymbol{x}}^{\text{p-sum},\star} \underbrace{\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})}_{=1} - \sum_{\boldsymbol{x}\in\mathcal{X}} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \underbrace{\beta_{t,\boldsymbol{x},a}^{\text{p-pos},\star}\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})}_{=0},$$

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where the equality to 0 indicated in the right-hand side correspond to (17). We now substitute (18) into (24) and obtain

$$T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] = B_T (\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star})^{\text{T}} \mathbf{1} + \sum_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \beta_{t, \boldsymbol{x}}^{\text{p-sum},\star} \, .$$

The left-hand side equals $\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)$ since $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ is the solution of the primal problem. Thus, the equality above entails, by $\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{p-sum},\star} \geqslant \mathbf{0}$, that

$$\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) \geqslant B_T (\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star})^{\text{T}} \mathbf{1} \, . \tag{25}$$

B.3 Third Step: Various High-Probability Controls

We prove below that on the intersection between the event $\mathcal{E}_{\text{prob},\delta}$ of Lemma 1 and another event $\mathcal{E}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$, also of probability at least $1 - \delta$, we have simultaneously that for all rounds $t \geqslant 2$, the policy $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ is obtained by Phase 2, i.e., by solving $\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)$, and that

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T} - \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4}{\delta}} - E_T \tag{26}$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \leqslant \left(B_T + 1 + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} \right) \mathbf{1} = (B-1)\mathbf{1} \, ,$$

where the bound E_T was defined in (12) and where we used the definition of B_T, namely,

$$B_T = B - 2 - \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} \, . \tag{27}$$

This definition requires that

$$B > c \left(2 + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} \right) \tag{28}$$

for $c = 1$, but we will rather assume that the inequality holds with $c = 2$.

Applications of the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality to handle the conversions y_t. We recall that we defined h_0 as the empty vector and $h_t = (\boldsymbol{x}_s, a_s, y_s)_{s \leqslant t}$ for $t \geqslant 1$. We introduce the filtration $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geqslant 0}$, with $\mathcal{F}_0 = \sigma(a_1, \boldsymbol{x}_1)$ and for $t \geqslant 1$,

$$\mathcal{F}_t = \sigma\big(h_t, \, a_{t+1}, \, \boldsymbol{x}_{t+1}\big) \, .$$

Then, for all $t \geqslant 1$, the variables $r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t$ and $\boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t$ are $\mathcal{F}_t$–measurable, with conditional expectations with respect to $\mathcal{F}_{t-1}$ equal to

$$\mathbb{E}\big[r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \,\big|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\big] = r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \mathbb{E}\big[\boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \,\big|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\big] = \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, .$$

Indeed, the conditioning by $\mathcal{F}_{t-1}$ fixes a_t and $\boldsymbol{x}_t$, but not y_t, and exactly means, when $a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}$, integrating over $y_t \sim P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$. When $a_t = a_{\text{null}}$, all equalities above remain valid thanks to the abuse of notation discussed in Section 2.1. Given that r takes values in $[0, 1]$ and $\boldsymbol{c}$ in $[0, 1]^d$, we may apply $d + 1$ times the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality (once for r and each component of c) together with a union bound: there exist two events $\mathcal{E}_{r,P,\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\boldsymbol{c},P,\delta}$, each of probability at least $1 - \delta/4$, such that

$$\text{on } \mathcal{E}_{r,P,\delta}, \qquad \sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \geqslant \sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) - \sqrt{\frac{T}{2} \ln \frac{4}{\delta}}$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \text{on } \mathcal{E}_{\boldsymbol{c},P,\delta}, \qquad \sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \leqslant \sqrt{\frac{T}{2} \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} \, \mathbf{1} + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, .$$

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Applications of the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality to use the properties of the $p_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$. For this sub-step, we rather condition directly by h_{t-1} (instead of $\mathcal{F}_{t-1}$ as in the previous step), where $t \geqslant 2$. Conditioning by h_{t-1} amounts to integrating first over $a_t \sim p_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$ and then over $\boldsymbol{x}_t \sim \nu$: this is because of the definition of the random draw of a_t according to $p_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$ independently from everything else, and because $\boldsymbol{x}_t$ is drawn independent from the past according to ν. More precisely, for each $t \geqslant 2$, given that U_{t-1} is h_{t-1}–measurable, we thus have the following equalities:

$$\mathbb{E}\big[r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \,\big|\, h_{t-1}\big] = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \,\Big|\, h_{t-1}\right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right]$$

and $\qquad \mathbb{E}\big[\boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \,\big|\, h_{t-1}\big] = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \,\Big|\, h_{t-1}\right]$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right],$$

where we recall that $\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}$ denotes an integration solely over $\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu$.

By definition of $p_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$, whenever the adaptive policy reaches Phase 2 at a given round $t \geqslant 2$:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] = \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T}$$

and $\qquad \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] \leqslant \frac{B_T}{T}\mathbf{1}\,.$

Otherwise, the adaptive policy is stuck in Phase 0, because at least one cost constraint is larger than $B - 1$; in this case, $p_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) = \delta_{a_{\text{null}}}$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ and both expectations above are null. We may summarize all cases by introducing the indicator function that all cost constraints are smaller than $B - 1$,

$$\mathbb{1}_{\{\boldsymbol{C}_{t-1} \leqslant (B-1)\mathbf{1}\}}\,, \qquad \text{where} \qquad \boldsymbol{C}_{t-1} = \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \boldsymbol{c}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\, y_s\,,$$

and stating that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] \geqslant \mathbb{1}_{\{\boldsymbol{C}_{t-1} \leqslant (B-1)\mathbf{1}\}} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T}$$

and $\qquad \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] \leqslant \frac{B_T}{T}\mathbf{1}\,.$

Therefore, a second series of applications of the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality (at times $2 \leqslant t \leqslant T$, i.e., excluding the first round) entails the existence of two events $\mathcal{E}_{r,U,\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\boldsymbol{c},U,\delta}$, each of probability at least $1 - \delta/4$, such that

on $\mathcal{E}_{r,U,\delta}$, $\qquad \displaystyle\sum_{t=2}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{1}_{\{\boldsymbol{C}_{t-1} \leqslant (B-1)\mathbf{1}\}} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T} - \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4}{\delta}}$

and on $\mathcal{E}_{\boldsymbol{c},U,\delta}$, $\qquad \displaystyle\sum_{t=2}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \leqslant \left(B_T + \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}}\right)\mathbf{1}\,.$

Appeal to results of Appendix B.1. The inequalities (10) and (11) state that on the event $\mathcal{E}_{\text{prob},\delta}$ of Lemma 1, we have

$$\forall t \geqslant 1,\ \forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\},\ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + 2\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})\,.$$

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Thus, on $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$,

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) - 2\sum_{t=2}^{T} \varepsilon_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}$$

$$\geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) - E_T$$

and

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \leqslant \mathbf{1} + \sum_{t=2}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\,,$$

where we recall that the bound E_T was defined in (12).

Conclusion of this step.   We define

$$\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} = \mathcal{E}_{r,P,\delta} \cap \mathcal{E}_{\boldsymbol{c},P,\delta} \cap \mathcal{E}_{r,U,\delta} \cap \mathcal{E}_{\boldsymbol{c},U,\delta}\,,$$

which is an event of probability at least $1 - \delta$. On the intersection of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$, by collecting all bounds together, we have

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t \leqslant \left(B_T + 1 + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} \right) \mathbf{1} = (B - 1)\mathbf{1}\,.$$

This shows that on the intersection of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$, the indicator functions $\mathbb{1}_{\{\boldsymbol{C}_{t-1} \leqslant (B-1)\mathbf{1}\}}$ all equal 1, and that the policies $\boldsymbol{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ are always obtained by solving the optimization problems of Phase 2. We conclude this step by collecting the obtained bounds for rewards and by legitimately replacing the indicator functions therein by 1.

B.4 Fourth Step: Conclusion

In this step, we merely combine the bounds exhibited in the first three steps to obtain the closed-form expression of the regret bound. We then propose suitable orders of magnitude for the parameters.

Collecting all bounds to get a closed-form regret bound.   By considering $\boldsymbol{q} = \pi^\star(\boldsymbol{x})$ for each $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ in (23), where we recall that $\pi^\star$ is the optimal static policy, and by the equality (22), we note that, for all $t \geqslant 2$,

$$\forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})$$

$$\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{+} U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x})\,.$$

On the event $\mathcal{E}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta}$ of Lemma 1, the inequality (10) states that $U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \geqslant P(a, \boldsymbol{x})$, which we may substitute in the inequality above (thanks to the non-negative part in the right-hand side) to get

$$\forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})$$

$$\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{+} P(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x})$$

$$\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right) P(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x})\,.$$

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We replace the individual $\boldsymbol{x}$ by a random variable $\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu$ and integrate over $\boldsymbol{X}$: on $\mathcal{E}_{\text{prob},\delta}$,

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] \tag{29}$$

$$- \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$\geqslant \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, P(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]}_{= \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)/T} - \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, P(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]}_{\leqslant (B/T)\mathbf{1}}.$$

The equality to $\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)/T$ and the inequality $\leqslant (B/T)\mathbf{1}$ above come from the very definition of $\pi^\star$ as the static policy solving $\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)$. Similarly, Appendix B.3 shows that on the event $\mathcal{E}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$, for all $2 \leqslant t \leqslant T$, the policies $p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ are obtained by solving $\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)$, so that, by definition,

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, p_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] = \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T}.$$

Substituting this equality and the KKT condition (18) into (29) and rearranging, we see that we proved so far that on the intersection of $\mathcal{E}_{\text{prob},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$,

$$\forall \, 2 \leqslant t \leqslant T, \qquad \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) \leqslant (B - B_T) \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1}.$$

We may also substitute (25), i.e., $\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1} \leqslant \text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)/B_T$ and finally get that on the intersection of $\mathcal{E}_{\text{prob},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$,

$$\forall \, 2 \leqslant t \leqslant T, \qquad \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T) \leqslant \left(\frac{B}{B_T} - 1 \right) \text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T).$$

Summing over $2 \leqslant t \leqslant T$ and using that $\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)/T \leqslant 1$ by definition and by the fact that r takes values in $[0, 1]$, we obtain

$$\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T} \leqslant 1 + \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T}$$

$$\leqslant 1 + \left(\frac{B}{B_T} - 1 \right) \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T}. \tag{30}$$

Distinguishing the cases

$$\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T} \leqslant 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T} \geqslant 0,$$

we see, based on (30), that in both cases

$$\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, U_{t-1}, B_T)}{T} \leqslant 1 + \left(\frac{B}{B_T} - 1 \right) \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B).$$

We finally substitute (26) and have proved, as claimed, that on the intersection of $\mathcal{E}_{\text{prob},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$,

$$\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \leqslant 1 + \left(\frac{B}{B_T} - 1 \right) \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B) + E_T + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4}{\delta}}, \tag{31}$$

where we recall that E_T was defined in (12).

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Improving readability and setting λ. As indicated, we require (28) with $c = 2$. By the definition (27) of B_T and the inequality $1/(1-u) \leqslant 1 + 2u$ for $u \in (0, 1/2)$, we have

$$\frac{B}{B_T} - 1 \leqslant \frac{2\big(2 + \sqrt{2T \ln(4d/\delta)}\big)}{B}, \tag{32}$$

which we may substitute in (31). It only remains to deal with a bound on E_T to conclude the proof of Theorem 1.

We set below a value of λ larger than 1. Recalling that $\kappa \geqslant 4$, we may already bound E_T as

$$E_T \leqslant \gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta} \sqrt{\kappa\big(4\|\Theta\| + 2\big)} \sqrt{2mT \ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big)} = 2\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta} \sqrt{\kappa\big(2\|\Theta\| + 1\big)} \sqrt{mT \ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big)}, \tag{33}$$

where $\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta}$, defined in the statement of Lemma 1, may itself be bounded by

$$\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta} \leqslant \sqrt{\lambda}\big(\|\Theta\| + 1/2\big) + \frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}} \ln\left(\frac{2^m}{\delta}\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big)^{m/2}\right).$$

For the sake of simplicity, we set the value of λ by only optimizing the orders of magnitude in m and T of (this upper bound on) $\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta}$, i.e., by considering

$$\sqrt{\lambda} + \frac{m}{\sqrt{\lambda}} \ln T.$$

We take $\lambda = m \ln(1 + T/m)$, which is indeed larger than 1 given that $T \geqslant 2m$ and $\ln(1 + T/m) \geqslant 1$. We have

$$\frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}} \ln \frac{1}{\delta} \leqslant \ln \frac{1}{\delta} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}} \ln 2^m \leqslant (2\ln 2)\sqrt{m} \leqslant 2\sqrt{m},$$

as well as

$$\frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}} \ln\left(\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big)^{m/2}\right) \leqslant \frac{\sqrt{m}}{\sqrt{\ln(1 + T/m)}} \ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big) \leqslant \sqrt{m \ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big)}.$$

All in all,

$$\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta} \leqslant \big(\sqrt{m} + \|\Theta\| + 1/2\big)\sqrt{\ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{m}\Big)} + 2\sqrt{m} + \ln \frac{1}{\delta}. \tag{34}$$

Combining (33) and (34), we showed:

$$E_T \leqslant 2\sqrt{\kappa\big(2\|\Theta\| + 1\big)} \sqrt{mT \ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{4m}\Big)} \left(\big(\sqrt{m} + \|\Theta\| + 1/2\big)\sqrt{\ln\Big(1 + \frac{T}{m}\Big)} + 2\sqrt{m} + \ln \frac{1}{\delta}\right). \tag{35}$$

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C Adaptation of the Logistic-UCB1 Strategy of Faury et al. [2020]: Proof of Lemma 1

The proof is copied from the proof of Faury et al. [2020, Lemmas 1 and 2], with minor adjustments. We mostly provide it for the sake of self-completeness.

The adjustments are required because the setting of Faury et al. [2020] is slightly different: their action set is a subset $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, and when the learner picks an action $\boldsymbol{x}_t \in \mathcal{X}$ at round t, the obtained reward $r_t \in \{0, 1\}$ is drawn independently at random according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter $\eta(\boldsymbol{x}_t^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)$, where $\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is unknown. The learner then only observes r_t and not what would have been obtained with a different choice of action.

Therefore, the $\boldsymbol{x}_t$ and r_t of Faury et al. [2020] correspond to $\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$ and y_t in our setting. The main difference is that while the learner has a full control over the choice of $\boldsymbol{x}_t \in \mathcal{X}$ in the setting of Faury et al. [2020], in our setting, $\boldsymbol{x}_t \in \mathcal{X}$ is drawn by the environment and the learner only picks $a_t \in \mathcal{A}$; the learner therefore does not have a full control over $\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$. This is why we carefully check in the present appendix that the results by Faury et al. [2020] (namely, their Lemmas 1 and 2) extend to our setting.

Reminder — A tail inequality for self-normalized martingales. Theorem 1 of Faury et al. [2020] reads as follows. Let $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geqslant 0}$ be a filtration, $(\boldsymbol{U}_t)_{t \geqslant 1}$ an $\mathcal{F}$–adapted stochastic vector process in $\mathbb{R}^m$ such that $\|\boldsymbol{U}_t\| \leqslant 1$ a.s. for all $t \geqslant 1$, and $(\Delta_t)_{t \geqslant 1}$ an $\mathcal{F}$–martingale difference sequence with $|\Delta_t| \leqslant 1$ a.s. for all $t \geqslant 1$; i.e., for all $t \geqslant 1$, the random variable Δ_t is $\mathcal{F}_t$–measurable and

$$\mathbb{E}[\Delta_t \,|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}] = 0 \qquad \text{a.s.}$$

Denote $\sigma_t^2 = \mathbb{E}[\Delta_t^2 \,|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}]$, let $\lambda > 0$, and define, for $t \geqslant 1$:

$$S_t = \sum_{s=1}^{t} \Delta_s \boldsymbol{U}_s \qquad \text{and} \qquad M_t = \lambda \, \mathrm{I}_m + \sum_{s=1}^{t} \sigma_s^2 \boldsymbol{U}_s \boldsymbol{U}_s^{\mathsf{T}} \;.$$

Then, for all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability at least $1 - \delta$:

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \qquad \|S_t\|_{M_t^{-1}} \leqslant \frac{\sqrt{\lambda}}{2} + \frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}} \ln\left(\frac{2^m \det(M_t)^{1/2} \lambda^{-m/2}}{\delta} \right). \tag{36}$$

The result above is proved by Faury et al. [2020] based on Laplace's method on supermartingales, which is a standard argument to provide confidence bounds on self-normalized sums of conditionally centered random vectors and was previously introduced, in the context of linear contextual bandits, by Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [2011, Theorem 2]; see also the monograph by Lattimore and Szepesvári [2020, Theorem 20.2].

Step 1 — A martingale control. We apply (36) to the following elements. We take as filtration $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geqslant 0}$, with $\mathcal{F}_0 = \sigma(a_1, \boldsymbol{x}_1)$ and for $t \geqslant 1$,

$$\mathcal{F}_t = \sigma\big(h_t, \, a_{t+1}, \, \boldsymbol{x}_{t+1} \big),$$

where we recall $h_t = (\boldsymbol{x}_s, a_s, y_s)_{s \leqslant t}$. We set $\boldsymbol{U}_t = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$, which is indeed $\mathcal{F}_t$–measurable and with Euclidean norm smaller than 1 (thanks to the normalization assumed in Section 2.1). Finally, we set, for $t \geqslant 1$,

$$\Delta_t = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a_t = a_{\mathrm{null}}, \\ y_t - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) & \text{if } a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}, \end{cases}$$

which we rewrite, by the abuses of notation indicated in Section 2.1,

$$\Delta_t = \Big(y_t - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) \Big) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} = \big(y_t - P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \big) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} \;.$$

The conditioning by $\mathcal{F}_{t-1}$ fixes a_t and $\boldsymbol{x}_t$, but not y_t, and exactly means, when $a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}$, integrating over $y_t \sim P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$. We therefore have that Δ_t is $\mathcal{F}_t$–measurable, with

$$\mathbb{E}[\Delta_t \,|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}] = 0 \qquad \text{a.s.;}$$

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that is, $(\Delta_t)_{t\geqslant 1}$ appears as an $\mathcal{F}$–martingale difference sequence, satisfying the boundedness-by-1 constraint. We may therefore apply the result (36). To do so, we first compute the conditional variances of the Δ_t: for $t \geqslant 1$,

$$\mathbb{E}\big[\Delta_t^2 \,|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\big] = \mathbb{E}\left[\Big(y_t - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\Big)^2 \,\Big|\, \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right]\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}$$

$$= \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) \Big(1 - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\Big)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} = \dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}\,,$$

where we used the fact that $\eta(1 - \eta) = \dot{\eta}$. We rewrite

$$S_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \Delta_t\, \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s) = \sum_{s=1}^t \Big(y_s - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\Big)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}$$

and note that $M_t = W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ with the definition (5). The control (36) may be rewritten as follows: for all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability at least $1 - \delta$,

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \qquad \|S_t\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}} \leqslant \frac{\sqrt{\lambda}}{2} + \frac{2}{\sqrt{\lambda}}\, \ln\left(\frac{2^m \det\big(W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\big)^{1/2} \lambda^{-m/2}}{\delta}\right).$$

As $\dot{\eta} = \eta(1 - \eta) \in [0, 1/4]$ and as $\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}\| \leqslant 1$, we have, by a standard trace-determinant inequality (see, e.g., Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [2011, Lemma 10]),

$$\det\big(W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\big) \leqslant \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{m} \sum_{s=1}^t \dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\, \big\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\big\|^2\, \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}\right)^m$$

$$\leqslant \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{4m} \sum_{s=1}^t \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}\right)^m \leqslant \left(\lambda + \frac{t}{4m}\right)^m.$$

Combining the two inequalities, we have proved that for all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability at least $1 - \delta$,

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \qquad \|S_t\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}} \leqslant \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} - \sqrt{\lambda}\|\Theta\|\,, \tag{37}$$

where $\gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta}$ was defined in Lemma 1.

Step 2 — Application of the martingale control. The martingale control (37) is applied as follows. We show below that the definition (3) of $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t$ entails that

$$S_t - \lambda\, \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star = \Psi_t\big(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big) - \Psi_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\,, \tag{38}$$

where Ψ_t was defined in (4). Taking the $\|\cdot\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}}$ norms of both sides, together with a triangle inequality (keeping in mind the boundedness of Θ) and noting that

$$\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}} \leqslant \|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{(\lambda\, \mathrm{I}_m)^{-1}} = \|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|/\sqrt{\lambda}\,,$$

finally yields that for all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability at least $1 - \delta$,

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \qquad \Big\|\Psi_t\big(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big) - \Psi_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\Big\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}} \leqslant \|S_t\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}} + \sqrt{\lambda}\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\| \leqslant \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta}\,. \tag{39}$$

We now show (38). The gradient of the continuously differentiable function

$$\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}^m \longmapsto \sum_{s=1}^t \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} \Big(y_s \ln \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}\big) + (1 - y_s) \ln\Big(1 - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}\big)\Big)\Big) - \frac{\lambda}{2}\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|$$

vanishes at the point $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t$ where it achieves its maximum, i.e., $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t$ defined in (3) satisfies

$$\sum_{s=1}^t \Big(\eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big) - y_s\Big)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}$$

$$= \sum_{s=1}^t \left(y_s \frac{\dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big)\, \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)}{\eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big)} + (1 - y_s) \frac{\dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big)\, \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)}{1 - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big)}\right)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} = \lambda\, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\,,$$

where we used $\dot{\eta} = \eta(1 - \eta)$ to get the first equality. In particular,

$$\Psi_t\big(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big) = \sum_{s=1}^t \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big)\, \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} + \lambda\, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t = \sum_{s=1}^t y_s\, \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}}\,,$$

hence the stated rewriting (38).

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Step 3 — Bound on prediction error. We now proceed to bounding, for all $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}$:

$$\left|P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right| = \left|\eta(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star) - \eta(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right|.$$

As η is $1/4$–Lipschitz (given $\dot{\eta} = \eta(1 - \eta) \in [0, 1/4]$),

$$\left|\widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - P(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right| \leqslant \frac{1}{4} \left|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} (\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star - \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right|. \tag{40}$$

For two $m \times m$ symmetric definite positive matrices M and M', we write $M \succeq M'$ whenever $\|\boldsymbol{v}\|_M \geqslant \|\boldsymbol{v}\|_{M'}$ for all $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathbb{R}^m$. This inequality entails $(M')^{-1} \succeq M^{-1}$. We introduce below a symmetric definite positive matrix G_t such that

$$G_t \succeq \kappa^{-1} V_t, \qquad G_t \succeq \left(1 + 2\|\Theta\|\right)^{-1} W_t(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t), \qquad G_t \succeq \left(1 + 2\|\Theta\|\right)^{-1} W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star) \tag{41}$$

and

$$\Psi_t(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - \Psi_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star) = G_t(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t - \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star). \tag{42}$$

Based on all these properties, we get, by a Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in the norms $\|\cdot\|_{G_t}$ and $\|\cdot\|_{G_t^{-1}}$:

$$\left|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} (\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star - \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right|$$

$$\leqslant \left\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right\|_{G_t^{-1}} \left\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\right\|_{G_t}$$

$$= \left\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right\|_{G_t^{-1}} \left\|G_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right\|_{G_t^{-1}}$$

$$= \left\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right\|_{G_t^{-1}} \left\|\Psi(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - \Psi(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\right\|_{G_t^{-1}} \leqslant \sqrt{\kappa} \left\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right\|_{V_t^{-1}} \left\|\Psi(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - \Psi(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\right\|_{G_t^{-1}}.$$

A triangle inequality for the first inequality, followed by applying (41) for the second inequality, and applying the definition of (4) as a projection for the third inequality, shows that

$$\left\|\Psi(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - \Psi(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)\right\|_{G_t^{-1}} \leqslant \left\|\Psi(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - \Psi(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right\|_{G_t^{-1}} + \left\|\Psi(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star) - \Psi(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right\|_{G_t^{-1}}$$

$$\leqslant \sqrt{1 + 2\|\Theta\|} \left(\left\|\Psi(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - \Psi(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right\|_{W_t(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)^{-1}} + \left\|\Psi(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star) - \Psi(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}}\right)$$

$$\leqslant 2\sqrt{1 + 2\|\Theta\|} \left\|\Psi(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star) - \Psi(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\right\|_{W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star)^{-1}}.$$

Substituting the martingale control (39) and collecting all bounds together finally yields

$$\left|\widehat{P}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - P(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right| \leqslant \frac{\sqrt{\kappa}}{2} \left\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right\|_{V_t^{-1}} \sqrt{1 + 2\|\Theta\|} \ \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta},$$

as desired.

Note in particular that (39) holds for all $t \geqslant 1$ with probability $1 - \delta$, and that we took care of the dependencies on a and $\boldsymbol{x}$ through the $\left\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right\|_{V_t^{-1}}$ term. This explains why the result of Lemma 1 holds with probability $1 - \delta$ for all $t \geqslant 1$, all $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}$ and all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$.

Step 4 — Construction of the matrix G_t. It only remains to show that there exists a symmetric definite positive matrix G_t such that (41) and (42) hold. We define

$$G_t = \int_{[0,1]} W_t\big(v\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1 - v)\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) \, \mathrm{d}v$$

$$= \lambda\, \mathrm{I}_m + \sum_{s=1}^{t} \left(\int_{[0,1]} \dot{\eta}\big(v\,\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1 - v)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) \, \mathrm{d}v\right) \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}\}}.$$

The thus defined matrix G_t is indeed symmetric definite positive matrix. By definition of κ and the fact that Θ is convex, we have, for all $v \in [0, 1]$,

$$\dot{\eta}\big(v\,\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1 - v)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) = \dot{\eta}\Big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} \big(v\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1 - v)\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\Big) \geqslant \kappa^{-1},$$

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which also immediately entails the first inequality of (41). To prove (42), we introduce, for $s \geqslant 1$ such that $a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}$, the continuously differentiable function

$$f_{s,t} : v \in [0,1] \longmapsto f_{s,t}(v) = \eta\big(v\,\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1-v)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big),$$

with derivative

$$\dot{f}_{s,t}(v) = \dot{\eta}\big(v\,\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1-v)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\,\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t - \boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big),$$

and we have

$$\eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big) - \eta\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big) = f_{s,t}(1) - f_{s,t}(0) = \int_{[0,1]} \dot{f}_{s,t}(v)\,\mathrm{d}v,$$

These facts, combined with the definition of G_t, immediately entail (42).

It only remains to prove the third inequality of (41), namely,

$$G_t \succeq \big(1 + 2\|\Theta\|\big)^{-1} W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star),$$

as the second one is obtained by symmetry from there, by exchanging the roles of $\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star$ and $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t$. To do so, we rely on the following inequality: for all $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$\int_{[0,1]} \dot{\eta}\big(z_1 + v(z_2 - z_1)\big)\,\mathrm{d}v \geqslant \frac{\dot{\eta}(z_1)}{1 + |z_1 - z_2|}. \tag{43}$$

This inequality is proved, in the case $z_1 \neq z_2$, by noting that the second-order derivative of η equals

$$\ddot{\eta}(x) = \frac{\mathrm{e}^{-x} - 1}{1 + \mathrm{e}^x}\,\dot{\eta}(x), \qquad \text{where} \qquad \frac{\mathrm{e}^{-x} - 1}{1 + \mathrm{e}^x} \in [-1, 1],$$

so that for all $z, z' \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$\ln \dot{\eta}(z') - \ln \dot{\eta}(z) = \int_z^{z'} \frac{\ddot{\eta}(\tau)}{\dot{\eta}(\tau)}\,\mathrm{d}\tau \geqslant -|z' - z|, \qquad \text{i.e.,} \qquad \dot{\eta}(z') \geqslant \dot{\eta}(z)\,\mathrm{e}^{-|z'-z|}.$$

Therefore,

$$\int_{[0,1]} \dot{\eta}\big(z_1 + v(z_2 - z_1)\big)\,\mathrm{d}v \geqslant \int_{[0,1]} \dot{\eta}(z_1)\,\mathrm{e}^{-v|z_1-z_2|}\,\mathrm{d}v = \dot{\eta}(z_1)\frac{1 - \mathrm{e}^{-|z_1-z_2|}}{|z_1 - z_2|} \geqslant \frac{\dot{\eta}(z_1)}{1 + |z_1 - z_2|},$$

where we applied the inequality $(1 - \mathrm{e}^{-x})/x \geqslant 1/(1 + x)$, which holds for all $x \geqslant 0$.

We go back to proving the third inequality of (41). With (43) for the first inequality, followed by an application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the second inequality, and the fact that $\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star, \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t \in \Theta$ have Euclidean norms smaller than $\|\Theta\|$, together with $\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}\| \leqslant 1$, we have, for all $s \geqslant 1$ with $a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}$,

$$\int_{[0,1]} \dot{\eta}\big(v\,\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t + (1-v)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\,\mathrm{d}v$$

$$\geqslant \dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\Big(1 + \big|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star - \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)\big|\Big)^{-1}$$

$$\geqslant \dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\Big(1 + \big\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\big\|\,\big\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star - \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\big\|\Big)^{-1}$$

$$\geqslant \dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\big(1 + 2\|\Theta\|\big)^{-1}.$$

As $\big(1 + 2\|\Theta\|\big)^{-1} \leqslant 1$, we can then conclude, from the definition of G_t, that

$$G_t \succeq (1 + 2\|\Theta\|)^{-1}\left(\lambda\,\mathrm{I}_m + \sum_{s=1}^t \dot{\eta}\big(\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star\big)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\text{T}}\mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}\}}\right)$$

$$= (1 + 2\|\Theta\|)^{-1} W_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star),$$

as announced. This concludes the proof.

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D Proof of the Regret Bound in Case of an Unknown Distribution ν: Proof of Theorem 2

We rather explain the differences to and modifications with respect to the proof of Appendix B.

To best do so, we use $\widehat{}$ superscripts to index various quantities defined based on the estimations $\widehat{\nu}_t$, even though these quantities are not themselves estimators. In particular, the budget parameter is denoted by $\widehat{B}_T$; we refer to the policies computed at rounds $t \geqslant 2$ by $\widehat{p}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$, and by $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_\delta$ the event of Lemma 1 for the sampling strategy pulling actions $a_t \sim \widehat{p}_t(\boldsymbol{x}_t)$, which is exactly the strategy that we are analyzing here; and finally, the optimal dual variables linked to the budget are denoted by $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}$.

D.1 Key New Building Block: Uniform Deviation Inequality

Throughout this appendix, we will need to relate quantities defined based on $\widehat{\nu}_t$ to the target quantities defined based on ν. All these quantities will be of the form: for $1 \leqslant t \leqslant T$ and for various functions $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$,
$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\big[f(\boldsymbol{X})\big] \qquad \text{and} \qquad \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\big[f(\boldsymbol{X})\big].$$
A simple (but probably slightly suboptimal) way to do so is to apply $T|\mathcal{X}|$ times the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality together with a union bound. We get that on an event $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$ of probability at least $1 - \delta$,

$$\forall\, 1 \leqslant t \leqslant T, \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \big|\widehat{\nu}_t(\boldsymbol{x}) - \nu(\boldsymbol{x})\big| \leqslant \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}\,.$$

In particular, with probability at least $1 - \delta$, for all functions $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$ and all $1 \leqslant t \leqslant T$,

$$\left|\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\big[f(\boldsymbol{X})\big] - \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\big[f(\boldsymbol{X})\big]\right| \leqslant \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \big|\widehat{\nu}_t(\boldsymbol{x}) - \nu(\boldsymbol{x})\big| \leqslant |\mathcal{X}|\sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}\,. \tag{44}$$

We now explain the adaptations required (or not required) for each of the four steps of the proof provided in Appendix B.

D.2 First and Second Steps: No Adaptation Required

These two steps do not require any adaptation; we merely re-state the useful results extracted therein, with the corresponding adapted notation.

The first step (Appendix B.1) held for any sampling strategy. Therefore, the same upper-confidence bonuses (9) and Lemma 1 entail that on an event $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_\delta$ of probability at least $1 - \delta$, for all $t \geqslant 1$, all $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\mathrm{null}}\}$, and all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$:
$$P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + 2\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})\,. \tag{45}$$

The bound (12) also still holds, as it was obtained in a deterministic manner not using any specific feature of the sampling strategy; namely,
$$2\sum_{t=2}^{T} \varepsilon_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} \leqslant E_T\,. \tag{46}$$

Similarly, the second step (Appendix B.2) actually yielded general results between the primal and the dual formulations of the OPT problems considered. The equality (18), the characterizations (22) and (23), as well as the inequality (25) may be instantiated with $\widehat{\nu}_t$ (in lieu of ν) and $\widehat{B}_T$ (in lieu of B_T) as follows. For each $t \geqslant 2$ such that the cost constraints of Phase 0 of the adaptive policy are not violated and the optimization problem $\mathrm{OPT}\big(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T\big)$ is to be solved, there exists a vector $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star} \geqslant \boldsymbol{0}$ such that first,

$$\big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(\boldsymbol{X})\right] = \frac{\widehat{B}_T}{T} \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{1}\,. \tag{47}$$

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Second, for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \right) U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{x})\, q_a(\boldsymbol{x})$$

$$= \max_{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{+} U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{x})\, q_a(\boldsymbol{x}) \quad (48)$$

and

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{x}) \in \underset{\boldsymbol{q}\in\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})}{\operatorname{argmax}} \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{+} U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{x})\, q_a\,. \quad (49)$$

Third,

$$\operatorname{OPT}\big(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T\big) \geqslant \widehat{B}_T \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\text{T}} \mathbf{1}\,. \quad (50)$$

D.3 Third Step: Most of the Adaptations Lie Here

We show below that on the intersection between the events $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{prob},\delta}$ and $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}$, introduced above, and another event $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$, also of probability at least $1 - \delta$, we have that

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t \leqslant (B-1)\,\mathbf{1}\,.$$

Therefore, on this intersection of three events, for all rounds $t \geqslant 2$, the policy $\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ is obtained by Phase 2, i.e., by solving $\operatorname{OPT}\big(\nu_t, U_{t-1}, B_T\big)$.

Similarly, we then prove below that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}$,

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t \geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \overbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} r(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X})\right]}^{=\operatorname{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)/T}$$

$$- \left(E_T + \sqrt{2T\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}} + |\mathcal{X}|\sqrt{2T\ln\frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \right). \quad (51)$$

The inequalities that may be extracted from Appendix B.3. Several applications of the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality, together with a union bound, show that there exist an event $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$ of probability at least $1 - \delta$ such that, simultaneously:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t \geqslant \sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) - \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4}{\delta}}\,, \quad (52)$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, y_t \leqslant \sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, P(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) + \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}}\,\mathbf{1}\,, \quad (53)$$

$$\sum_{t=2}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\nu}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} r(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X})\right] - \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4}{\delta}}\,, \quad (54)$$

$$\sum_{t=2}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\, U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \leqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\nu}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X})\right] + \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}}\,\mathbf{1}\,. \quad (55)$$

Dealing with the cost constraints. Now, for each $t \geqslant 2$, the definition of $\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$, no matter whether it is provided by Phase 0 or Phase 2 of the adaptive policy, ensures that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X}\sim\widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X})\right] \leqslant \frac{\widehat{B}_T}{T}\,\mathbf{1}\,.$$

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By (44) and the fact that the sums at stake below lie in $[0, 1]$, we have, on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$, that for all $t \geqslant 2$,

$$
\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right]
$$
$$
\leqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \, \mathbf{1} \, .
$$

Combining the two inequalities above with (53) and (55), as well as with the bounds $P \leqslant U_{t-1}$ of (45), we proved so far that

$$
\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta} \, , \quad \sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \leqslant \left(\widehat{B}_T + 1 + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} + \sum_{t=2}^{T} |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \right) \mathbf{1} \, .
$$

Since $\sum_{t \leqslant T} 1/\sqrt{t} \leqslant 2\sqrt{T}$ and by the definition of $\widehat{B}_T$ (see the statement of Theorem 2), we proved that

$$
\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta} \, , \quad \sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \leqslant (B - 1)\mathbf{1} \, ,
$$

as claimed. Therefore, on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$, the adaptive policy of Box B of Section 3 never stays in Phase 0 and instead solves, at each round $t \geqslant 2$, the Phase-2 problem $\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)$.

Dealing with the rewards. By (52) and (54), by the bound $U_{t-1} \leqslant P + 2\varepsilon_{t-1}$ of (45) together with the bound E_T of (46), and by the uniform control (44), we have similarly that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$,

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right]
$$
$$
- \left(E_T + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \right) .
$$

Given that on the intersection of events considered, the adaptive policy solves $\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)$ for all $t \geqslant 2$, we have

$$
\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] = \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} \, . \tag{56}
$$

This concludes the proof of (51), and hence, the adaptation of the third step.

D.4 Fourth Step: Some Adaptations are Also Required

In this final step, we collect the bounds from the previous three steps. Some (rather minor) adaptations are required, e.g., we would like to integrate (48) and (49) over $\widehat{\nu}_t$ in the left-hand sides and ν in the right-hand sides.

Main modification. We consider some $t \geqslant 2$. For each $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$, we apply (48) and (49) with $\boldsymbol{q} = \pi^{\star}(\boldsymbol{x})$ and get

$$
\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right) U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})
$$
$$
\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star} \right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right)_{+} U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \, \pi_a^{\star}(\boldsymbol{x}) \, .
$$

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The bound $U_{t-1} \geqslant P$ of (45) and the non-negative parts taken in the right-hand side then entail that

$$\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{prob},\delta}, \qquad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \right) U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{x})$$

$$\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \right)_+ P(a,\boldsymbol{x}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x}) \, .$$

We replace the individual $\boldsymbol{x}$ by a random variable $\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t$ and take expectations with respect to $\boldsymbol{X}$:

$$\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{prob},\delta}, \qquad \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \right) U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$\geqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \right)_+ P(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] .$$

Thanks to the non-negative parts in the right-hand side, we identify some function $f(\boldsymbol{X})$ where f takes values in $[0,1]$, so that we may apply the uniform control (44) and get

$$\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}, \qquad \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \right)_+ P(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$\geqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \right)_+ P(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] - |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}$$

$$\geqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \right) P(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] - |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \, ,$$

where for the second inequality, we simply dropped the non-negative parts.

The rest of the proof for this final step is basically unchanged. Combining all the bounds exhibited so far in this updated fourth step, we have, for each $t \geqslant 2$,

$$\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}, \qquad \overbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X}) \right]}^{= \text{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)/T}$$

$$- \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1},\boldsymbol{X}) \right]$$

$$\geqslant \overbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, P(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]}^{= \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)/T}$$

$$- \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, P(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{X}) \right]}_{\leqslant (B/T)\mathbf{1}} - |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \, ,$$

where we substituted the inequalities stemming from the definition of $\pi^\star$ as well as the rewriting (56). Rearranging the inequality above and substituting (47), we get that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}$,

$$\frac{\text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)}{T} - \frac{\text{OPT}\big(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T\big)}{T}$$

$$\leqslant \frac{B \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1}}{T} - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{c}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, U_{t-1}(a,\boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}$$

$$= \frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{T} \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1} + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{1}{2t} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \, . \tag{57}$$

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Summing this bound over $2 \leqslant t \leqslant T$ and combining it with (50), we obtain that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$,

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} \leqslant 1 + \frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{\widehat{B}_T} \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \,.$$

By distinguishing the cases

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} \leqslant 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} \geqslant 0 \,,$$

the inequality above entails that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$,

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} \leqslant \frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{\widehat{B}_T} \mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} + 1 \,.$$

Substituting this upper bound into (51), we finally obtain that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{prob},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$,

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} r(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \, y_t \leqslant \frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{\widehat{B}_T} \mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B)$$

$$+ E_T + \underbrace{\sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} + 2|\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} + 1}_{\leqslant 2b_T} \,.$$

We conclude the proof by the same modifications to improve readability as at the end of the proof of Theorem 1: namely, since the definition of E_T did not change, the bound (35) is still applicable, while

$$\frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{\widehat{B}_T} \leqslant \frac{2b_T}{B} = \frac{1}{B}\left(4 + 2\sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4d}{\delta}} + 2|\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}\right)$$

is obtained with the same techniques and similar conditions as for (32).

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E Details for the Material of Section 6

In this section, we first recall (Appendix E.1) the setting of linear CBwK introduced by Agrawal and Devanur [2016]—and actually, slightly generalize it to match the setting of CBwK for a logistic-regression conversion model. We then state the adaptive policy considered (Appendix E.2), which relies on upper-confidence estimates of the rewards and lower-confidence estimates of the cost vectors. We also state the corresponding estimation guarantees in a key lemma (Lemma 3). The heart of this section is to state, discuss (Appendix E.3) and prove (Appendix E.4) a regret bound, matching the one of Agrawal and Devanur [2016, Theorem 3], with a slight improvement consisting of a relaxation of the budget constraints. For the sake of completeness, we finally recall (Appendix E.5) the statement of the adaptive policy of Agrawal and Devanur [2016].

E.1 Setting

The setting is the following. We consider a finite action set $\mathcal{A}$ including a no-op action a_{null}, a finite context set $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, a number T of rounds and a total budget constraint $B > 0$. All these parameters are known. Contexts $\boldsymbol{x}_1, \boldsymbol{x}_2, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_T$ are drawn i.i.d. according to some distribution ν. At round $t \geqslant 1$, the learner observes the context $\boldsymbol{x}_t$, picks an action a_t and, conditionally to $\boldsymbol{x}_t$ and a_t, when $a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}$, obtains a reward $r_t \in [0,1]$ drawn independently at random according to a distribution with expectation $\overline{r}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$, where

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\mu}_\star \,,$$

and suffers a vector cost $\boldsymbol{c}_t \in [0,1]^d$ drawn independently at random according to a distribution with vector of expectations $\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$, where each component $\overline{c}_i$ of $\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}$, for $i \in \{1, \ldots, d\}$, is given by

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \overline{c}_i(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{\star,i} \,.$$

In the definitions above, $\boldsymbol{\varphi} : \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}^m$ is a known transfer function, with $\|\boldsymbol{\varphi}\| \leqslant 1$, and $\boldsymbol{\mu}_\star$ and the $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\star,i}$ are unknown parameters in $\mathbb{R}^m$. We assume that these unknown parameters lie in some bounded set Θ, with maximal norm still denoted by $\|\Theta\|$. When $a_t = a_{\text{null}}$, the obtained reward and suffered costs are null: $r_t = 0$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_t = \boldsymbol{0}$.

Comparison to the canonical setting of linear CBwK.   Note that in the original formulation of Agrawal and Devanur [2016], we have (where $\boldsymbol{x}_a$ also denote vectors):

$$\boldsymbol{x} = \big(\boldsymbol{x}_a\big)_{a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{x}_a \,.$$

Benchmark and regret.   The goal is still to maximize the accumulated rewards while controlling the costs:

$$\text{maximize} \quad \sum_{t \leqslant T} r_t \quad \text{while controlling} \quad \sum_{t \leqslant T} \boldsymbol{c}_t \leqslant B\boldsymbol{1} \,.$$

The goal can be equivalently defined as the minimization of the regret while controlling the costs, where the regret equals

$$R_T = \text{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) - \sum_{t \leqslant T} r_t$$

for the benchmark given by the static policy $\pi^\star$ achieving the largest expected cumulative rewards under the condition that its cumulative vector costs abide by the budget constraints in expectation, i.e.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) = \max_{\pi : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \ & T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] \\
\text{under} \qquad & T \, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X}) \right] \leqslant B\boldsymbol{1} \,.
\end{aligned}
\tag{58}
$$

In the sequel, we will use the definition (58) of OPT with different quadruplets of parameters; see, for instance, the definition of the adaptive policy of Box C.

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E.2 Statement of an Adaptive Policy

The considered adaptive policy is stated in Box C. It is adapted from the adaptive policy of Section 3. The (almost only) changes lie in Phase 1, which depends heavily of the model. Here, we resort (as Agrawal and Devanur [2016]) to a LinUCB-type estimation of the parameters of the stochastic linear bandits yielding rewards and costs. Based on these estimated parameters, we are able to issue, at each round $t \geqslant 2$, an upper-confidence expected reward function U_{t-1} and a lower-confidence expected vector-cost function $\boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}$. We also use the empirical estimate of the context distribution. In Phase 2, we solve the OPT problem on these estimates and with the conservative budget $\widehat{B}_T$.

The adaptive policy of Box C bears links, and actually generalizes, the one by Xu and Truong [2019]. The setting of the latter reference is more limited as more information is provided to the learner, such as the costs for taking each action and the distribution ν of contexts (clients in their case).

For the sake of completeness, we state in Appendix E.5 the adaptive policy introduced by Agrawal and Devanur [2016].

The main additional ingredient in the analysis of the policy of Box C, compared to the analyses of the adaptive policy of Section 3, is a guarantee on the outcomes of Phase 1. We recall that we assumed that the parameters $\boldsymbol{\mu}_\star$ and $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\star,i}$ lie in a bounded set Θ with maximal norm denoted by $\|\Theta\|$.

Lemma 3 (direct adaptation from Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [2011, Theorem 2]). *Fix any sampling strategy and consider the version of LinUCB given by Phase 1 of Box C. For all $\delta \in (0,1)$, there exists an event $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{lin},\delta}$ with probability at least $1-\delta$ and such that over $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{lin},\delta}$:*

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \ \forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{null}\}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \left| \widehat{r}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right| \leqslant \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} \left\| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right\|_{X_t^{-1}}$$

$$and \qquad \left| \widehat{\boldsymbol{c}}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right| \leqslant \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} \left\| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right\|_{X_t^{-1}} \mathbf{1},$$

where

$$\gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} = \frac{1}{4} \sqrt{m \ln \frac{1 + t/(\lambda m)}{\delta/(d+1)}} + \sqrt{\lambda}\|\Theta\|.$$

Proof sketch. We explain why the bound for $\overline{r}$ holds with probability at least $1 - \delta/(d+1)$. The lemma follows by repeating the argument for the components of $\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}$ and resorting to a union bound.

Given that rewards lie in $[0,1]$ and are thus $1/4$–sub-Gaussian, the martingale analysis by Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [2011, Theorem 2], with the same adaptations as the ones carried out in Appendix C to take into account the rounds when $a_t = a_{\text{null}}$, shows that with probability at least $1 - \delta/(d+1)$,

$$\forall t \geqslant 1, \qquad \left\| \boldsymbol{\mu}_t - \boldsymbol{\mu}_\star \right\|_{X_t} \leqslant \frac{1}{4} \sqrt{m \ln \frac{1 + t/(\lambda m)}{\delta/(d+1)}} + \sqrt{\lambda}\|\Theta\| = \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} \,.$$

We then proceed similarly to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequalities following (42): for all $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}$ and $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\left| \widehat{r}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right| = \left| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \left(\boldsymbol{\mu}_{t-1} - \boldsymbol{\mu}_\star \right) \right| \leqslant \left\| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right\|_{X_t^{-1}} \left\| \boldsymbol{\mu}_t - \boldsymbol{\mu}_\star \right\|_{X_t}.$$

This concludes the proof. $\qquad \square$

As a consequence, we set, when defining the adaptive policy of Box C,

$$\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} \left\| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \right\|_{X_s^{-1}}$$

for all $s \geqslant 1$, and denote by $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{lin},\delta}$ the event of Lemma 3 for the sampling policy of Box C. This event is of probability at least $1 - \delta$. We have:

$$\text{on } \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{lin},\delta}, \qquad \forall t \geqslant 1, \ \forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X},$$

$$\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant \overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + 2\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \tag{59}$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \boldsymbol{L}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant \boldsymbol{L}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + 2\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})\mathbf{1} \,. \tag{60}$$

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BOX C: LINUCB FOR DIRECT SOLUTIONS TO OPT PROBLEMS

Parameters: regularization parameter $\lambda > 0$; conservative-budget parameter $\widehat{B}_T$; upper-confidence bonuses $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x}) > 0$, for $s \geqslant 1$ and $(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \big(\mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}\big) \times \mathcal{X}$.

Round $t = 1$: play an arbitrary action $a_1 \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}$

At rounds $t \geqslant 2$:

<u>Phase 0</u> If $\displaystyle\sum_{s \leqslant t-1} \boldsymbol{c}_s \leqslant (B-1)\mathbf{1}$ is violated, then $\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) = \delta_{a_{\text{null}}}$ for all $\boldsymbol{x}$

<u>Phase 1</u> Otherwise, estimate the parameters by

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}_{t-1} = X_{t-1}^{-1} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\, r_s$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{t-1,i} = X_{t-1}^{-1} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\, c_{s,i}$$

$$\text{where} \qquad X_t = \sum_{s=1}^{t} \mathbb{1}_{\{a_s \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s) \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} + \lambda\,\mathrm{I}_m$$

Define the expected reward function $\widehat{r}$ and cost function $\widehat{\boldsymbol{c}}_{t-1} = \big(\widehat{c}_{t-1,i}\big)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant d}$ as

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \widehat{r}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\mu}_{t-1}$$
$$\text{and} \quad \forall 1 \leqslant i \leqslant d, \qquad \widehat{c}_{t-1,i} = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{t-1,i}$$

Build the upper-confidence expected reward function U_{t-1} and the lower-confidence expected vector-cost function $\boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}$ as

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X},$$
$$U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \max\Big\{\min\big\{\widehat{r}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + \varepsilon_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}),\, 1\big\},\, 0\Big\}$$
$$\boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \max\Big\{\min\big\{\widehat{\boldsymbol{c}}_{t-1} - \varepsilon_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\mathbf{1},\, \mathbf{1}\big\},\, \mathbf{0}\Big\}$$

where the maximum and minimum are taken pointwise in the definition of $\boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}$

Set $U_{t-1}(a_{\text{null}}, \boldsymbol{x}) = 0$ and $L_{t-1}(a_{\text{null}}, \boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbf{0}$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$

Also estimate the context distribution by $\quad \widehat{\nu}_t = \dfrac{1}{t} \displaystyle\sum_{s=1}^{t} \delta_{\boldsymbol{x}_s}$

<u>Phase 2</u> Compute the solution $\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ of

$$\text{OPT}\big(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, B_T\big) = \max_{\pi: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} T\, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X})\right]$$

$$\text{under} \qquad T\, \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \pi_a(\boldsymbol{X})\right] \leqslant B_T \mathbf{1}$$

Draw an arm $a_t \sim \widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}_t)$

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E.3 Regret Bound

We sketch in Appendix E.4 below the proof of the following result. We use the $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ indicated by Lemma 3.

Theorem 3. *In the setting of Appendix E.1, we consider the adaptive policy of Box C of Appendix E.2. We set a confidence level $1 - \delta \in (0, 1)$ and use parameters $\lambda = m \ln(1 + T/m)$, a working budget of $\widehat{B}_T = B - b_T$, where*

$$b_T = 2 + m\big(2\sqrt{2}\|\Theta\| + 1\big)\sqrt{T}\ln\frac{1 + T/m}{\delta/(d+1)} + \sqrt{2T\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}} + |\mathcal{X}|\sqrt{2T\ln\frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}},$$

and $\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \gamma_{t,\lambda,\delta} \big\| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \big\|_{X_t^{-1}}$. Then, provided that $T \geqslant 2m$ and $B > 2b_T$, we have, with probability at least $1 - 3\delta$,

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} r_t \leqslant 2b_T\left(1 + \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B)}{B}\right).$$

The order of magnitude of the regret bound, in terms of T, m, and B is

$$\frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B)}{B} \, m\sqrt{T}\ln T.$$

This matches the regret bound achieved by Agrawal and Devanur [2016, Theorem 3], except that the latter reference required a budget B of order $T^{3/4}$ up to logarithmic terms, while we relax the budget amount to $B \geqslant 2b_T$, i.e., B of order $\sqrt{T}$ up to logarithmic terms.

Also, and more importantly, we provide a natural strategy in Box C, whose parameters are easy to tune, while the fully adaptive algorithm underlying Agrawal and Devanur [2016, Theorem 3] has to estimate a critical parameter Z to trade off rewards and costs (the equivalent of our $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}$ dual optimal variable). This Z should be of order $\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B)/B$ and $\sqrt{T}$ initial rounds of the strategy underlying Agrawal and Devanur [2016, Theorem 3] are devoted to computing a suitable value of Z.

We also provide, in the analysis of Appendix E.4, a rigorous treatment of the use of the no-op action a_{null}.

However, the main advantage of Agrawal and Devanur [2016, Theorem 3] over Theorem 3 above lies in the absence of finiteness restriction on the context set $\mathcal{X}$, which we have to (somewhat artificially) introduce to ensure that the linear program of Phase 2 of the adaptive policy of Box C is tractable.

E.4 Proof Sketch of Theorem 3

We use the same $\widehat{}$conventions as in Appendix D. The main (but rather minor) changes with respect to the proofs of Appendices B and D are specifically underlined below. The reason why it is handy to consider instead a lower-confidence bound on the vector costs is to be found in Step 4 below.

Step 1. The first step corresponds to Lemma 3 above, together with the introduction of the bound E_T. Given that we pick $\lambda = m\ln(1 + T/m) \geqslant 1 \geqslant 1$, we get the following counterpart of (12), by replacing κ by 1:

$$2\sum_{t=2}^{T} \varepsilon_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t)\mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} \leqslant 2\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta}\sqrt{2mT\ln\left(1 + \frac{T}{\lambda m}\right)} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} E_T.$$

Substituting the value of λ and upper bounding $\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta}$ by

$$\gamma_{T,\lambda,\delta} \leqslant \left(\|\Theta\| + \frac{1}{4}\right)\sqrt{m\ln\frac{1 + T/m}{\delta/(d+1)}},$$

we get

$$E_T \leqslant m\big(2\sqrt{2}\|\Theta\| + 1\big)\sqrt{T}\ln\frac{1 + T/m}{\delta/(d+1)}.$$

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Step 2. There are three main outcomes of Step 2 (see the summary in Appendix D.2). Up to considering the new $U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ and $\boldsymbol{L}_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ in lieu of the $r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ and $\boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) U_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})$, respectively, we have the following counterparts to (18), (20) and (25). For each $t \geqslant 2$ such that the cost constraints of Phase 0 of the adaptive policy of Box C are not violated and the optimization problem $\text{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)$ is to be solved, there exists a vector $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star} \geqslant \boldsymbol{0}$ such that the complementary slackness condition of KKT reads

$$\left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] = \frac{\widehat{B}_T}{T}\left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{1}\,, \tag{61}$$

the policy $\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ satisfies

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}}_t(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{q} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}}\left(U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right) q_a\,, \tag{62}$$

and the value of the optimization problem is larger than

$$\text{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T) \geqslant \widehat{B}_T\left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\text{budg},\star}\right)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{1}\,. \tag{63}$$

Step 3. The uniform deviation argument (8), formulated equivalently as (44), still holds, on an event referred to as $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}$. Also, we assumed that rewards r_t and cost vectors $\boldsymbol{c}_t$ are bounded in $[0, 1]$ and $[0, 1]^d$, respectively. Several applications of the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality, together with a union bound, show that there exist an event $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{HAz},\delta}$ of probability at least $1 - \delta$ such that, simultaneously, various high-probability controls similar to (52)–(55) hold. We do not rewrite them explicitly.

On the intersection $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}$, we have

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}_t$$

$$\leqslant \sum_{t=1}^{T} \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} + \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}}\,\boldsymbol{1}$$

$$\leqslant 1 + \sum_{t=2}^{T} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\text{null}}\}} + \left(E_T + \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}}\right)\boldsymbol{1}$$

$$\leqslant 1 + \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] + \left(E_T + \sqrt{2T\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}}\right)\boldsymbol{1}$$

$$\leqslant 1 + \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right]$$

$$\qquad\qquad\qquad + \left(E_T + \sqrt{2T\ln\frac{4d}{\delta}} + |\mathcal{X}|\sqrt{2T\ln\frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}\right)\boldsymbol{1}\,,$$

where, among others, we used (60) and the definition of E_T for the second inequality. Note that the E_T term was not necessary in Appendices B and D as we were then using an upper-confidence bound on the vector costs, obtained thanks to an upper-confidence bound on the conversion rate. At each round $t \geqslant 2$, whether the strategy picks $\widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \cdot)$ in Phase 0 (in which case the left-hand side in the display below equals $\boldsymbol{0}$) or Phase 2 (in which case we have an equality in the display below), it holds that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t}\left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X})\, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X})\right] \leqslant \frac{\widehat{B}_T}{T}\boldsymbol{1}\,.$$

Substituting the value of $\widehat{B}_T$, we proved that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\text{unif},\delta}$, which is an event of probability at least $1 - 3\delta$,

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \boldsymbol{c}_t \leqslant (B - 1)\boldsymbol{1}\,.$$

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This shows that on this intersection of events, the adaptive policy of Box C always resorts to Phase 2. We will consider this event for the rest of the proof, so that the results of Step 2 may be applied.

We may proceed similarly for rewards, based on (59): on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} r_t
$$

$$
\geqslant \sum_{t=1}^{T} \overline{r}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} - \sqrt{\frac{T}{2} \ln \frac{4}{\delta}}
$$

$$
\geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} U_{t-1}(a_t, \boldsymbol{x}_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{a_t \neq a_{\mathrm{null}}\}} - \left(E_T + \sqrt{\frac{T}{2} \ln \frac{4}{\delta}} \right)
$$

$$
\geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right] - \left(E_T + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4}{\delta}} \right)
$$

$$
\geqslant \sum_{t=2}^{T} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{X}) \, \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{X}) \right]}_{= \mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)/T} - \Big(\underbrace{E_T + \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{4}{\delta}} + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}}_{\leqslant b_T} \Big),
$$

$$
\tag{64}
$$

where the indicated equality to $\mathrm{OPT}\big(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T\big)$ follows from the fact that on the considered intersection of events, the adaptive policy always resorts to Phase 2. We also used the piece of notation b_T introduced in the statement of Lemma 3.

Step 4. We build on (62) as follows. By the existence of a_{null}, the maximum in (62) can be taken with non-negative parts. We also substitute the upper confidence control (59) and the lower confidence control (60)—this piece of the proof is the very reason why such upper and lower confidence estimates were picked. We get: on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$, for all $t \geqslant 2$, for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$
\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big) \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})
$$

$$
= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big)_{+} \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x})
$$

$$
\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big)_{+} \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x})
$$

$$
\geqslant \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big)_{+} \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x}) .
$$

The rest of the proof follows the exact same logic as in Appendices B and D. By replacing the $\boldsymbol{x}$ by a random variable $\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t$ and integrating, we have, on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$, that for all $t \geqslant 2$,

$$
\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big) \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \right]
$$

$$
\geqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big)_{+} \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x}) \right]
$$

$$
\geqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big)_{+} \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x}) \right] - |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{t}{2} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} ,
$$

where the second inequality follows by (44), which is legitimately applied thanks the fact that the sum over a in the right-hand side takes values in $[0, 1]$, given the non-negative parts and the fact that $\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqslant 1$ by definition. Now, with (61) and the definition of $\pi^\star$: on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$, for all

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$t \geqslant 2$,

$$\frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} - \frac{\widehat{B}_T}{T} \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1}$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \widehat{\nu}_t} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big) \widehat{p}_{t,a}(h_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{x}) \right]$$

$$\geqslant \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{X} \sim \nu} \left[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Big(\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \Big)_+ \pi_a^\star(\boldsymbol{x}) \right] - |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{t}{2} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}$$

$$\geqslant \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B)}{T} - \frac{B}{T} \big(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1} - |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{\frac{t}{2} \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} \, .$$

Based on these inequalities, we have

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T}$$

$$\leqslant |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} + 1 + \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{T} \big(\boldsymbol{\beta}_t^{\mathrm{budg},\star}\big)^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{1}$$

$$\leqslant |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}} + 1 + \frac{B - \widehat{B}_T}{\widehat{B}_T} \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T} \, ,$$

where we substituted (63) for the second inequality. By a case analysis, we finally proved that on $\widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{HAz},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{lin},\delta} \cap \widehat{\mathcal{E}}_{\mathrm{unif},\delta}$,

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) - \sum_{t=2}^{T} \frac{\mathrm{OPT}(\widehat{\nu}_t, U_{t-1}, \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}, \widehat{B}_T)}{T}$$

$$\leqslant \left(\frac{B}{\widehat{B}_T} - 1 \right) \mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) + \underbrace{1 + |\mathcal{X}| \sqrt{2T \ln \frac{2T|\mathcal{X}|}{\delta}}}_{\leqslant b_T} \, .$$

The proof is concluded by combining the inequality above with the bound (64) on cumulative rewards:

$$\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} r_t \leqslant \underbrace{2b_T + \left(\frac{B}{\widehat{B}_T} - 1 \right) \mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B)}_{\leqslant 2b_T} \, ,$$

where the bound on $B/\widehat{B}_T - 1$ is obtained with the same techniques and similar conditions as for (32).

E.5   Reminder: Algorithm 1 from Agrawal and Devanur [2016]

We recall (and actually slightly adapt to our setting) the adaptive policy of Agrawal and Devanur [2016] titled Algorithm 1 therein. We describe it in Box D. One of the adaptations is to state it with general upper-confidence bonuses $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x}) > 0$. As in Agrawal and Devanur [2016], who proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3, we will use the same values for $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ as in Theorem 3. The same comment applies to λ. Another adaptation is that we specified the online convex optimization algorithm to be used and picked a simple strategy (instead of other possible choices discussed in Agrawal and Devanur [2016]), namely, the projected gradient descent introduced by Zinkevich [2003]. The latter relies on a learning rate $\eta > 0$. The drawback of the projected gradient descent is however that its dependency in the ambient dimension is suboptimal.

The final parameter of the adaptive policy of Box D is a parameter Z to trade off between rewards and costs. A recommended choice is, for instance, $Z = \mathrm{OPT}(\nu, \overline{r}, \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}, B)/B$, the issue being that, of course, the latter value is unknown. In the simulation study of Appendix F, we will provide a good value of Z to the adaptive policy, even though Agrawal and Devanur [2016] introduce a variant with a preliminary exploration phase meant to provide in an automatic way such a good value for Z.

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BOX D: ADAPTATION OF ALGORITHM 1 FROM AGRAWAL AND DEVANUR [2016]

Parameters: regularization parameter $\lambda > 0$; trade-off parameter Z between reward and costs; upper-confidence bonuses $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x}) > 0$, for $s \geqslant 1$ and $(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \big(\mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}\big) \times \mathcal{X}$; learning rate $\eta > 0$.

Round $t = 1$: play an arbitrary action $a_1 \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}$; pick $\boldsymbol{\zeta}_1 = \mathbf{0}$

At rounds $t \geqslant 2$:

<u>Phase 0</u> If $\displaystyle\sum_{s \leqslant t-1} \boldsymbol{c}_s \leqslant (B-1)\mathbf{1}$ is violated, then $a_t = a_{\text{null}}$

<u>Phase 1</u> Otherwise, estimate the parameters by

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}_{t-1} = X_{t-1}^{-1} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\, r_s$$

$$\text{and} \qquad \widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{t-1,i} = X_{t-1}^{-1} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\, c_{s,i}$$

$$\text{where} \qquad X_t = \sum_{s=1}^{t} \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)\boldsymbol{\varphi}(a_s, \boldsymbol{x}_s)^{\mathrm{T}} + \lambda\, \mathrm{I}_m$$

Define the expected reward function $\widehat{r}$ and cost function $\widehat{\boldsymbol{c}}_{t-1} = \big(\widehat{c}_{t-1,i}\big)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant d}$ as

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \ \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \qquad \widehat{r}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\mu}_{t-1}$$
$$\text{and} \ \ \forall 1 \leqslant i \leqslant d, \qquad \widehat{c}_{t-1,i} = \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x})^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{t-1,i}$$

Build the upper-confidence expected reward function U_{t-1} and the lower-confidence expected vector-cost function $\boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}$ as

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}, \ \ \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X},$$
$$U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \widehat{r}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) + \varepsilon_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$$
$$\boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \widehat{\boldsymbol{c}}_{t-1} - \varepsilon_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\mathbf{1}$$

<u>Phase 2</u> Play

$$a_t \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{a \in \mathcal{A}\setminus\{a_{\text{null}}\}} \ U_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) - Z\left(\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{t-1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{L}_{t-1}(a, \boldsymbol{x})\right)$$

Compute

$$\boldsymbol{\zeta}_t = \Pi_{\text{unit}}\left(\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{t-1} + \eta\big(\boldsymbol{c}_{t-1} - (B/T)\mathbf{1}\big)\right)$$

where Π_{unit} denotes the Euclidean projection onto the unit ℓ_1–ball

$$\left\{\boldsymbol{\zeta} \in \mathbb{R}^d : \boldsymbol{\zeta} \geqslant \mathbf{0} \text{ and } \zeta_1 + \ldots + \zeta_d \leqslant 1\right\}$$

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F Simulation Study

This appendix reports numerical simulations performed on partially simulated but realistic data (Appendix F.1), for the sake of illustration only. We describe (Appendix F.2) the specific experimental setting of CBwK for a conversion model considered—i.e., the features available, the parameters of the logistic regression, the reward and cost functions. A key point is that continuous variables are used to define rewards, costs, and even the conversion rate, while the adaptive policy of Box C must discretize these variables to solve its Phase 2 linear program. Though the experimental setting introduced is not a setting of linear CBwK, we may still apply the Box D adaptive policy (Appendix F.3), with the underlying idea that it provides linear approximations to non-linear reward and cost functions. We carefully explain how the hyper-parameters picked (Appendix F.4) before providing and discussing the outcomes of the simulations (Appendix F.5). The main outcome is that, as expected, the ad hoc adaptive policy of Box C outperforms the adaptive policy of Box D, which essentially linearly approximates non-linear rewards and costs. We end with a note (Appendix F.6) on the computation environment and time.

F.1 Data Preparation and Available Contexts

The underlying dataset for the simulations is the standard "default of credit card clients" dataset of UCI [2016], initially provided by Yeh and Lien [2009]. (It may be used under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International [CC BY 4.0] license.) This dataset is originally for comparing algorithms predicting default probability of credit card clients. It includes some socio-demographic data, debt level, and payment/default history of the clients. It also includes a target measuring whether the client will default in the future (1-month ahead). We transform it to match our motivating application of market share expansion for loans, described in Appendix A. To do so, we consider each line of the dataset as a loan application. We then discard some variables (e.g., the target) and create new ones (requested amount, standard interest rate offered, risk score). Below, we begin with describing the variables that we keep as they are and explain next how we created the additional variables, based on existing ones.

Variables retrieved. The variable *Age* provides the age of a given client at the time of the loan application, in years. We discretize it into 5 levels with similar numbers of loan requests in each level. The cutoffs for each level are 27, 31, 37, and 43, respectively. This gives rise to a variable referred to as *Age–discrete*.

The variable *Education* reports the education level of a client; in the data there are 4 levels: "others" (level 1, representing 2% of clients), "high school" (level 2, with a share of 16%), "university degree" (level 3, with 47%), and "graduate school degree" (level 4, with 35%).

Finally, the variable *Marital status* provides the marital status of a client: "others" (level 1, accounting for 1.3% of clients), "single" (level 2, for 53.3% of clients), and "married" (level 3, for 45.4%).

Variables created based on existing ones. We create a variable *Requested amount*, in dollars ($), based on a variable provided in the data set that measures the current debt level, in dollars, of the clients: we do so by multiplying the debt level by 0.2. We cap the value of *Requested amount* to 100K$. We then discretize *Requested amount* into 5 levels with similar numbers of loan requests in each level; the obtained variable is referred to as *Requested amount–discrete*. The cutoffs for each level are 10K$, 20K$, 36K$, and 54K$, respectively.

For the final two variables, *Standard interest rate* and *Risk score*, we first build a probability-of-default model with the variables from the raw database as predictors and the occurrence of a default within the next month as a target. This probability-of-default model is based on XGBoost (Chen and Guestrin [2016]), run with no penalization, depth 3, learning rate 0.01, subsample parameter 0.8, min child weight 10, and number of trees 1,176. We only set the number of trees by cross validation, while the rest of the hyper-parameters were set arbitrarily. As the default target is on a credit card, the predicted default rate seems high compared to what we deem as typical default rates on loans. We therefore divide the predicted probability of default by factor of 4 and cap this probability to 20%. This gives us a working variable called *PD*, for probability of default.

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We build a *Risk score* rating the risk of a client's default, with 5 levels, coded from A (level 1) to E (level 5), where E represents the highest risk. It is created based on the 20% - 40% - 60% - 80% quantiles of *PD*.

We finally set the *Standard interest rate* variable as 0.9 times the *PD*, with a maximal value of 18% and a minimum one of 1%. This constitutes an oversimplification of risk-based pricing, since we do not take into account any loss given default; but we do not have enough information in the dataset to do so, which is why we basically assume that the loss given default is constant. Then, theory has it that the *Standard interest rate* can be considered proportional to *PD*, and we carefully picked the factor 0.9 to get realistic values. In the dataset, the thus created *Standard interest rate* variable exhibits an average of 4.9%, with median 3.3%. An important note is that this variable is continuous and does not take finitely many values, while the setting described in Section 2.1 imposes such a restriction (the linear setting of Section 6 does not require it). We discuss below how we take this fact into account: by only using this variable for the conversion model (i.e., in Phase 1 of the adaptive policy of Box C), but not to pick actions (i.e., not in Phase 2 of the adaptive policy of Box C).

Lastly, we filter the database to remove the outliers: the lines for which *Standard interest rate* times *Requested amount* is larger than 10K, which happens for 133 clients. Our final database contains 29,867 loan applications, out of which we will bootstrap $T = 50,000$ applications.

Additional comments. Note that for *Requested amount* and *Age*, the discretizations performed aim to get five balanced classes; however, as some requests are with some specific boundary values, we do not get exact equal distributions over the classes.

All the parameters, constants, and cutoff/filter thresholds used in this data preparation step were decided arbitrarily and were not based on any real information. The context variables here were also selected somewhat arbitrarily (based on their availability), and solely for illustration purposes. In reality, the variables that can be used for commercial discounts need to comply with relevant laws, regulations and company's internal compliance rules.

Summary. The context $\boldsymbol{x}$ for a given client thus contains the following variables: *Age*, *Age-discrete*, *Education*, *Marital status*, *Requested amount*, *Requested amount–discrete*, *Risk score*, and *Standard interest rate*. Categorical variables are hot-one encoded via binary variables.

F.2 Specific Setting of CBwK for Logistic Conversions

We recall that our aim is to provide simulations matching the motivating example of market share expansion for loans described in Appendix A. We take as action set, i.e., as possible discount rates, $\mathcal{A} = \{a_{\text{null}}, 0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.55, 0.8\}$.

Features. The feature vectors $\varphi_{\text{conv}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ used are composed of only some of the variables defining the context $\boldsymbol{x}$, namely, *Age-discrete*, *Education*, *Marital status*, *Requested amount–discrete*, *Risk score*, and *Standard interest rate* (we recall that this variable is not discrete but will not use it in the linear program of Phase 2), with the addition of a new variable called *Final interest rate* equal to the discounted standard interest rate offered, i.e., *Final interest rate = Standard interest rate* $\times (1 - a)$.

Reward and vector cost functions. We use the following (normalized) reward and cost functions, inspired from Appendix A. We set a common duration for all loans, say, 2 years, so that the requested amount equals the outstanding. For all $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a_{\text{null}}\}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}$,

$$r(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = x_{\text{am}}/M_{\text{am}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \big(a/M_{\text{disc}},\ x_{\text{ir}}x_{\text{am}}/M_{\text{ir,am}}\big) \qquad (65)$$

where x_{am} and x_{ir} denote the components of the context $\boldsymbol{x}$ containing the *Requested amount* and *Standard interest rate*, respectively, and the normalization factors equal $M_{\text{am}} = 10^5$, $M_{\text{disc}} = 7$, and $M_{\text{ir,am}} = 9,996$.

Note that the definition of the first cost here is different from that in Appendix A: we use a/M_{disc} here instead of $\mathbb{1}_{\{a \neq 0\}}$ there. We do so not to disfavor the Box D policy, see details in Appendix F.3 below.

Conversion rate function P. We model the conversion rate function P with the logistic-regression model stated in (1), with $\varphi = \varphi_{\text{conv}}$, and only need to provide the numerical value of $\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star$, which we do

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Table 1: Coefficients picked for the logistic-regression model of P.

Intercept			0.8177		
Continuous variable			Single coefficient		
Final interest rate			−13.1101		
Discrete variables	Coefficients for each level				
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5
Risk score	−0.3045	−0.0383	0.0515	0.1261	0.1636
Requested amount–discrete	0.7093	0.4703	0.1113	−0.2748	−1.0179
Age–discrete	−0.1837	−0.1392	−0.0476	0.1096	0.2592
Education	0.1836	0.0126	−0.0896	−0.1084	
Marital status	0.0799	0.0102	−0.0918		

in Table 1. This model, as well as the Phase 1 learning of $\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star$ described by (3)–(5) in Section 3, holds for possibly non-discrete contexts.

The numerical values picked for $\boldsymbol{\theta}_\star$ were so in some arbitrary way, to get somewhat realistic outcomes with a simple model structure. We imposed monotonicity constraints, as these are most natural: for instance, the conversion rate increases with the level of *Risk score* and *Age–discrete* increase, and decreases with the level of *Education*, *Requested amount–discrete*, and *Final interest rate*. The coefficients for *Marital status* indicates that conversions are more likely for clients that are single than for married clients.

The average conversion rate in the case $a = 0$ of no discount (i.e, by replacing *Final interest rate* by *Standard interest rate*) is around 50%.

Adaptive policy: based only on the discrete variables. As indicated above, the logistic-regression model and the learning of its parameters apply to continuous variables. The restriction that the context set $\mathcal{X}$ should be finite only came from Phase 2 of the Box C adaptive policy, i.e., the linear program—in particular, for it to be computationally tractable. Here, we thus restrict our attention to policies that map the discrete variables in $\boldsymbol{x}$ to distributions over $\mathcal{A}$: policies that ignore the variables *Age*, *Requested amount*, and *Standard interest rate*. For the first two variables, they may use their discretized versions *Age–discrete* and *Requested amount–discrete*. For *Standard interest rate*, given how it was constructed, *Risk Score* appears as its discretized version.

The aim of these simulations is to show, among others, that using discretizations only in Phase 2 is relevant and efficient.

Note that, on the theoretical side, the proof sketches provided in Sections 4 and 5 reveal that the errors $\varepsilon_t(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ for learning $\theta_\star$ and P, obtained as outcomes of the first step of the analyses, are carried over in the subsequent steps, where the optimization part is evaluated. Using discretizations only in Phase 2 does therefore not come at the price of loosing theoretical guarantees.

F.3 Consideration of the Box D Adaptive Policy for Linear CBwK

In these experiments, we also consider the Box D adaptive policy of Appendix E.5, which was introduced by Agrawal and Devanur [2016] in a different setting. To be as fair as possible to this adaptive policy, we do so with the extended features $\varphi_{\text{lin}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ consisting of the features $\varphi_{\text{conv}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ described above and three additional components: the discount a, the *Requested amount* x_{am}, and the product $x_{\text{ir}} x_{\text{am}}$ of the *Requested amount* by the *Standard interest rate*. Actually, to ensure that $\varphi_{\text{lin}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \in [0, 1]^m$, the last two components added are normalized: we rather use $x_{\text{am}}/M_{\text{am}}$ and $x_{\text{ir}} x_{\text{am}}/M_{\text{ir,am}}$. The reward and vector cost functions introduced in (65) are linear in $\varphi_{\text{lin}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$. Even better, each component of $r(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ and $\boldsymbol{c}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ is given directly by a component of $\varphi_{\text{lin}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$—an extremely simple linear dependency on $\varphi_{\text{lin}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$.

However, the expected reward and cost functions

$$\overline{r}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = r(a, \boldsymbol{x})\, P(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \qquad \text{and} \qquad \overline{\boldsymbol{c}}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{c}(a, x)\, P(a, \boldsymbol{x})\,,$$

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which are the ones that should be linear in $\varphi_{\text{lin}}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ according to the setting described in Appendix E.1, are not linear in these features. This is due to the $P(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ terms, which are given by logistic regressions.

The Box D adaptive policy is therefore disadvantaged. This is even more true as it models rewards and costs independently, while they are coupled through conversions. We nonetheless consider this linear-modeling policy because a typical justification for linear approximations is that they offer a typical and efficient first-stage approach to possibly complex problems. Another reason was the desire to have some competitor to our policy in the simulations, and Box D adaptive policy was an easy-to-implement strategy—unlike the policies by Badanidiyuru et al. [2014] and Agrawal et al. [2016], which rely on considering finitely many benchmark policies.

All in all, we report the performance of the Box D policy as well in our experiments, though, as expected, the ad-hoc Box C policy outperforms it.

F.4 Hyper-parameters Picked

We actually set the hyper-parameters based on the budget B, and therefore, first explain how we set its possible values. It turns out that setting $B \geqslant 3{,}650$ is equivalent to not imposing any constraint, while setting $B \geqslant 2{,}900$ is equivalent to no second budget constraint. To get meaningful results, we therefore picked $B = 1{,}600$ and $B = 2{,}200$ as the two possible values for B. We now describe how we tune each of the two adaptive policies considered.

Hyper-parameters common to the two adaptive policies. We take $T = 50{,}000$ clients in the experiments, by bootstrapping them from the enriched dataset prepared in Appendix F.1. We set initial 50 rounds as a warm start for the sequential logistic regression and sequential linear regression carried out in Phase 1 of the adaptive policies.

Both adaptive policies use upper-confidence bonuses $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x})$, which are roughly of the form (considering λ as a constant)
$$C\big(1 + \ln s\big) \big\| \boldsymbol{\varphi}(a, \boldsymbol{x}) \big\|_{X_s^{-1}},$$
where the matrix X_s was defined in Box C; for simplicity, we set $\kappa = 1$, so that the matrices V_s of Lemma 1 and X_s are equal, which explains the common form of the upper-confidence bonuses $\varepsilon_s(a, \boldsymbol{x})$. The hyper-parameter C controls the exploration: the higher C, the more exploration. We report in the simulations the results achieved for C in the range $\{0.025, 0.1, 0.3\}$. That range was set so that at round $s = 51$, which is the first round after the warm start, the $\varepsilon_{51}(a, \boldsymbol{x})$ take values around 0.05, 0.3, and 0.9, respectively.

For simplicity, we set $B_T = B$ as a working budget.

Hyper-parameters for the Box C adaptive policy. We feed this adaptive policy with a good value of λ, namely, $\lambda = 0.0129$. We obtained it by cross-validation on an independent T–sample of data, using the Phase 1 estimation. In the T–sample for estimating λ, at each round s, we take action from the optimal static policy and use the associated conversion y_s as target for estimation. We omit the projection step in Phase 1 by considering that a large enough set Θ was picked.

Hyper-parameters for the Box D adaptive policy. As discussed in Appendix E.5, we set $Z = \text{OPT}(\nu, P, B)/B$, that is, $Z = 5.16$ for $B = 1{,}600$ and $Z = 3.87$ for $B = 2{,}200$. We also set $\lambda = 0.2452$ for $B = 1{,}600$ and $\lambda = 0.2765$ for $B = 2{,}200$. These values were obtained as weighted averages: the sum of 0.5 times the optimal λ for rewards and 0.25 times the optimal λ for each of the two cost components. These optimal λs for rewards and cost components were set by cross validation on an independent T–sample; with actions a_s taken at each round s from the optimal static policy and associated rewards r_s and costs $\boldsymbol{c}_s$ as targets.

Finally, the learning parameter η was selected in the range $\{0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2\}$. We did so given the other choices, by picking in hindsight the η with best performance; this of course, just like the clever choice of Z, should give an advantage to the Box D adaptive policy. Namely, when $B = 1{,}600$, for C equal 0.025, 0.1, and 0.3, we selected η equal to 0.05, 0.01, and 0.1, respectively; and when $B = 2{,}200$, we selected η equal to 0.01, 0.01, and 0.05, respectively. When performing these retrospective choices, we however noted that the performance was not significantly impacted by the choice of η.

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F.5 Outcomes of the Simulations

We were limited by the computational power (see Appendix F.6) and could only perform 10 simulations for each pair of $B \in \{1{,}600,\ 2{,}200\}$ and $C \in \{0.025,\ 0.1,\ 0.3\}$. We report averages (strong lines) as well as ± 2 times the standard errors (shaded areas).

Figure 1 reports, in the first line of graphs, the regret achieved with respect to what achieves the optimal static policy, i.e.,

$$ t \longmapsto \frac{t}{T}\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B) - \sum_{s=1}^{t} r_s\,, $$

where $\mathrm{OPT}(\nu, P, B)$ is larger than $8{,}000$ for both values of B. This regret can take negative or positive values, but in expectation, it is non-negative. This is not immediately clear from the figure, which reports the empirical averages of the regret over 10 runs: these empirical averages are sometimes negative, but they always lie in confidence intervals containing the value 0.

The figures also reports, in the second and third lines, the difference between a constant linear increase of the costs (between a 0 initial cost and a final B cost) and the costs actually achieved by the adaptive policies. I.e., these graphs report the averages and standard errors of the following quantities: for each cost component $i \in \{1, 2\}$,

$$ t \longmapsto \sum_{s=1}^{t} c_{s,i} - \frac{t}{T}B\,; $$

by design, the difference above must be non-positive. The second line of Figure 1 deals with the first cost component, and its third line reports the results for the second cost component.

The experiments reveal that while both adaptive policies seem to achieve sublinear regret, the Box D adaptive policy, which is suited for the CBwK setting for a conversion model, performs better than the Box C adaptive policy in terms of rewards: it achieves a smaller, sometimes negative, regret. In terms of costs, we globally see the same trend, with, for a given value of C, the Box D adaptive policy suffering smaller costs than the Box C adaptive policy while achieving higher rewards. This hints at a better use of the discounts.

The hyper-parameter C has an interesting impact: the lower C, the lower the regret (the higher the rewards) and the lower the costs. Rewards and costs go hand in hand: for a given adaptive policy, higher rewards are associated with higher costs.

F.6 Computation Time and Environment

As requested by the NeurIPS checklist, we provide details on the computation time and environment. Our experiments were ran on the following hardware environment: no GPU was required, CPU is 2.7 GHz Quad-Core with total of 8 threads and RAM is 16 GB 2133 MHz LPDDR3. We ran 5 simulations with different seeds on parallel each time. In the setting and for the data described above, it took us 8 hours for each such bunch of 5 runs of the adaptive policy of Box C, and 1.5 hours for Box D.

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
Figure 1: Averages (*solid lines*) and ± 2 times standard errors (*shaded areas*), achieved on 10 runs by the Box C (*blue*) and Box D (*orange*) adaptive policies: of the regret (*first line*), of the difference of the first cost component to tB/T (*second line*), and of the difference of the second cost component to tB/T (*third line*), by the values of the budget (B = 1,600 in the *first column*, B = 2,200 in the *second column*). Figures are generated with Matplotlib (Hunter [2007]).

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